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To Bargain or Not to Bargain: A New
Chapter in Work Relocation Decisions*
B. Glenn George**
An employer's decision to relocate bargaining unit work,
whether involving only a few employees or an entire plant, tra-
ditionally has been considered an appropriate subject for bar-
gaining by the National Labor Relations Board.' With few
exceptions, the Board has required bargaining regardless of the
employer's motivation. Thus, the duty to bargain was "well set-
tled,"2 whether the employer was relocating to avoid unioniza-
tion,3 to reduce expenses, 4 or to improve production at a
different facility.5 An employer's refusal to bargain about relo-
cation was an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).6
In the recent decision of Otis Elevator Co. (Otis II),7 how-
ever, the Board abandoned this implicit per se approach and in-
stead developed a threshold test for determining whether an
employer must bargain about an economically motivated work
relocation decision.8 More importantly, Otis II was the Board's
first acknowledgment that First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB (FNM),9 a 1981 Supreme Court decision, applied to this
issue. In FNM, the Court created a balancing test, requiring
collective bargaining only in those cases in which the benefit of
bargaining for labor-management relations and the collective
* © 1984 by B. Glenn George and © 1985 by THE MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEW FOUNDATION. All rights reserved.
** Assistant Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law.
1. See infra notes 70-91 and accompanying text.
2. Tocco Div. of Park-Ohio Indus., Inc., 257 N.L.P.B. 413, 413 (1981), en-
forced, 702 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1983).
3. See cases cited infra note 46.
4. See, eg., Tocco Div. of Park-Ohio Indus., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. at 413.
5. See, ag., Otis Elevator Co. (Otis 1), 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981).
6. See Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978). en-
forced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979).
7. 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1281 (1984).
8. See infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
9. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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bargaining process outweighs the concomitant burden placed on
the conduct of the employer's business.O Although FNM in-
volved a partial closure"l rather than relocation, the Board cor-
rectly recognized that FNM governs such related types of
economically motivated decisions, yet inexplicably refused to
apply the balancing test mandated by the Court.12
Until Otis II, the Board apparently was determined to limit
FNM to partial closure cases,' 3 irrespective of the seemingly
broader language of the Court's decision. Following reconstitu-
tion by a new presidential administration,14 however, the Board
10. See infra notes 52-69 and accompanying text. The FNM Court was
concerned only about nondiscriminatory, economically motivated decisions.
FNM, 452 U.S. at 680. Partial closure or work relocation decisions motivated
by antiunion animus present separate issues under § 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), that are beyond the scope of
this Article. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380
U.S. 263 (1965).
11. See FNM, 452 U.S. at 680.
12. See infra notes 107-43 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
14. The original opinion in Otis I held that the employer was obligated to
bargain about its relocation decision. 255 N.L.R.B. at 236. The Otis I decision
was issued on March 25, 1981, by Members Fanning, Jenkins, and Zimmerman,
all appointees of former Democratic President Jimmy Carter. The terms of
Members Fanning and Jenkins expired in December 1982 and August 1983, re-
spectively. When the Supplemental Decision was published in Otis II on April
6, 1984, Chairman Dotson and Members Hunter and Dennis had been ap-
pointed by Republican President Ronald Reagan.
Alterations in the composition of the National Labor Relations Board by
new presidential administrations often trigger reversals of precedent and
changes of philosophy and direction. The Board consists of five members, in-
cluding the chairman, appointed for staggered five-year terms by the Presi-
dent, subject to Senate confirmation. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
§ 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). A President generally will have the opportu-
nity at some point in his or her administration to appoint a majority of the
Board's members. The election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in Novem-
ber 1952 resulted in the first Republican administration since the creation of
the Board in 1935. Following President Eisenhower's third Board appointment
in March 1954, the agency reconsidered and reversed a number of the Board's
precedents. See, e.g., F. MCCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD 60-62 (1974). Similarly, the Kennedy-Johnson Board al-
tered the Board's direction again in the 1960's. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. (Fibreboard II), 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962) (reversing Fibreboard I,
130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961)), enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), qffd, 379
U.S. 203 (1964).
Other recent reversals of the current Reagan Board include Gourmet
Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1105 (1984) (overruling
Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982)); Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. No.
198, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (1984) (overruling PPG Indus., Inc., 251
N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980)); Milwaukee Spring Div. of Illinois Coil Spring Co. (Mil-
waukee Spring 11), 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1065 (1984) (re-
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belatedly accepted its duty to adapt FNM to the issue of reloca-
tion decision bargaining. The four Board members's participat-
ing in the consideration of Otis II agreed that the employer's
decision to relocate unit work in order to consolidate duplica-
tive research efforts and update its technology was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. The Board was unable to
agree, however, on the appropriate analysis for reaching that
result. Only one member attempted a facsimile of the FAM
balancing test. , The remaining Board members, in two separate
opinions, created additional threshold tests that neither comply
with FNM nor provide a consistent approach for future
application.16
FNM, to be sure, inspired immediate and extensive criti-
cism.17 Although a more principled, or at least more predict-
able, approach might be preferable to the balancing test
versing Milwaukee Spring I, 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982)); Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B.
No. 86, 115 L.R.RFM. (BNA) 1056 (1984) (overruling Propco, Inc., 263 N.LR.B.
136 (1982)); United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 115 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1049 (1984) (overruling General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.I-R.B. 808
(1977)); Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 115 L.R.M. (BNA) 1025
(1984) (overruling Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975)).
15. A vacancy existed on the Board at the time of the Otis II decision.
16. See infra notes 107-40 and accompanying text.
17. See, ag., Gacek, The Employer's Duty to Bargain on Termination of
Unit Work, 32 LAB. L.J. 699 (1981); Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-
Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining,
68 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1982); Kohler, Distinctions Without Differences. Effects
Bargaining in Light of First National Maintenance, 5 INDUS. REL. LJ. 402
(1983); Note, The Supreme Court, 1980 Ter, Labor Law-Scope of Mandatory
Bargaining Under the NLRA, 95 HARv. L. REV. 91, 329 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Note, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term]; Note, Labor Law-A Balancing
of Interests Test Applied to the Duty to Bargain About a Partial Closing Deci-
sion First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLR3 61 N.C.L. REv. 365 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Note, A Balancing of Interests Test]; Note, Collective Bar-
gaining Over Plant Relocation Decisions: Let's Make a Deal, 18 NEw ENG.
L.. 715 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Let's Make a Deal]; Note, Em-
ployer's Duty to Bargain with Respect to Partial Termination of Business:
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 36 Sw. L.J. 793 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Southwestern Note]; Note, Enforcing the NLRA: The Need for a Duty
to Bargain over Partial Plant Closings, 60 TEx. L. REv. 279 (1982); Note, Labor
Law-An Employers Decision to Terminate Partially a Business Operation Is
Not a Mandatory Subject of Bargaining, 56 Tut. L. REv. 1065 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, An Employer's Decision to Terminate]; Comment, Job Secur.
ity, Managerial Prerogatives, and First National Maintenance 31 BUFFALO L.
REV. 509 (1982); Comment, Labor Law-The Employer's Duty to Bargain over
a Decision to Close Part of its Business, 12 MEM. ST. UJ. REv. 185 (1981);
Comment, Labor Law: An Employer's Duty to Bargain Concerning the Deci-
sion to Terminate Part of a Business, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 292 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Florida Comment].
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selected by the Court,18 this Article is not intended to add to
the wealth of literature evaluating the wisdom of the FNM re-
sult. Certain limitations of the FNM decision will inevitably be
reflected in the assessment of Otis II; this analysis, however, is
based on the premise that FNM represents the current state of
the law. Given the Court's infrequent consideration of this area
in the past,19 the Board's interpretation of FNM will likely gov-
ern employer's actions for the foreseeable future.20 Conse-
quently, following a brief statutory and case law history of the
employer's duty to bargain about work relocation decisions, this
Article will examine the three opinions in Otis II. Next, this
Article will propose a methodology for applying the FNM bal-
ancing test and then apply it to the relocation situation. The
purpose of this discussion is both to question the Board's substi-
tution of its own tests for that required by FNM and to offer a
formulation for application of the FNM test.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. STATUTORY HISTORY
The employer's duty to bargain with the collective bargain-
18. See Harper, supra note 17, at 1462-81; Note, A Balancing of Interests
Test, supra note 17, at 377; Note, Let's Make a Deal, supra note 17, at 739;
Southwestern Note, supra note 17, at 805; Florida Comment, supra note 17, at
303; see also Comment, "Partial Terminations"--A Choice Between Bargain-
ing Equality and Economic Efficiency, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1089 (1967) (ana-
lyzing factors to consider when determining if a partial closing decision is a
mandatory subject of bargaining).
19. The Court's first consideration of mandatory bargaining about man-
agement decisions of this type occurred in 1964 in Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). See infra notes 37-51 and accompanying
text. FNM was not decided until seventeen years later in 1981.
20. The Board was given the "primary task" of determining an employer's
bargaining obligation under the NLRA. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S.
488, 495 (1979). The Board has therefore maintained a policy of nonacquies-
cence with respect to circuit court holdings with which it disagrees. In other
words, the Board considers itself bound only by Supreme Court precedent. See
Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957), enforced, 260 F.2d
736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), affd, 361 U.S. 477 (1959) ("It has been the Board's consis-
tent policy for itself to determine whether to acquiesce in the contrary views
of a circuit court of appeals or whether, with due deference to the court's opin-
ion, to adhere to its previous holding until the Supreme Court of the United
States has ruled otherwise."); accord Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 615,
616 (1963). When the Board disagrees with the court of appeals, the circuit
court's holding is applied on remand "as the law of [the present] case only."
Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 498, 498 (1980).
Consequently, even if the circuit courts of appeals were to dispute the Board's
Otis 11 analysis, the Board may continue to use its approach until reversed by
the Supreme Court.
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ing representative chosen by the employees, now found in sec-
tion 8(a)(5), was imposed by the Wagner Act as part of the
original National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) enacted in
1935.21 Although the legislative history leaves no doubt as to
the importance of collective bargaining in the scheme of the
NLRA,22 it provides little guidance for determining the scope of
the employer's bargaining obligation. In response to concerns
raised by the Board's regulation of bargaining behavior under
the predecessor of section 8(a)(5), 23 Congress attempted in the
1947 amendments to the NLRA to define the duty to bargain.24
In its proposed form, section 8(d) limited collective bargaining
21. Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 8(5), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982)). That obligation, now found in § 8(a)(5), was
stated in the negative: an employer acts unlawfully, or commits an "unfair la-
bor practice," by "refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representative of
his employees." Such a duty gave substance to the affirmative right granted to
employees in § 7 of the Act "to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing." The importance of the employer's duty to bargain was
emphasized by Senator Wagner, the sponsor of the legislation:
[Tihe right of workers to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing must be matched by the correlative duty of em-
ployers to recognize and deal in good faith with these representatives.
The Government itself is held up to ridicule when the elections which
it supervises are rendered illusory by failure to acknowledge their
results.
79 CONG. REC. 7571 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 2321, 2336 (1949) [hereinafter cited
as NLRA HISTORY]. The Senate report later characterized the employees'
right to bargain collectively as a "mere delusion" in the absence of a corre-
sponding duty on the part of the employer. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 12 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA HISTORY, supra, at 2300, 2312.
22. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education
and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), re-
printed in 1 NLRA HISTORY, supra note 21, at 1373, 1419; Hearings on S. 2926
Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934)
(statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRA HISTORY, supra note 21, at
27, 38. The importance of collective bargaining is further reflected in the Act's
preamble. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
23. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947) (minority re-
port), reprinted in NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENr
RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 355, 362 (Senate Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare reprint 1974) [hereinafter cited as LMRA HISTORY]; S. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947), reprinted in LMRA HISTORY, supra, at 407, 430; H.R.
REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-23 (1947), reprinted in LMRA HISTORY,
supra, at 292, 310-24.
24. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) [herein-
after cited as LMRA]. The language of § 8(5) remained unchanged by the
amendments although the section was redesignated § 8(a)(5). The LMRA also
added a corresponding bargaining duty for unions in § 8(b)(3). See LMRA, ch.
120, sec. 101, § 8(b)(3), 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3)
(1982)).
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to five categories of subjects.25 Congress rejected such specific-
ity, however, in favor of more general language requiring bar-
gaining over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment."26
The legislative histories of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) are of
little value in determining whether an employer's decision to
relocate bargaining unit work is a "term or condition" of em-
25. The House bill introduced designated the subjects of bargaining as:
(i) Wage rates, hours of employment, and work requirements; (ii)
procedures and practices relating to discharge, suspension, lay-off, re-
call, seniority, and discipline, or to promotion, demotion, transfer and
assignment within the bargaining unit; (iii) conditions, procedures,
and practices governing safety, sanitation, and protection of health at
the place of employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of absence; and (v)
administrative and procedural provisions relating to the foregoing
subjects.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947), reprinted in LMRA HISTORY,
supra note 23, at 158, 166-67; see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23
(1947), reprinted in LMRA HISTORY, supra note 23, at 292, 313-14.
26. LMRA, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(d), 61 Stat. 136, 140 (1947) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982)). Section 8(d) provides in relevant part:
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the per-
formance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the represen-
tative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any ques-
tions arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in
effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an indus-
try affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also
mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such
contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification-
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of
the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the
expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no
expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to
make such termination or modification;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the pur-
pose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the
proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute,
and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial
agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the
State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agree-
ment has been reached by that time; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike
or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract
for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the
expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later. . ..
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ployment.2 7 Rather than attempting an exhaustive definition,
Congress intended "terms and conditions of employment" to be
a flexible standard, subject to the changing circumstances and
needs of labor and management. 28 The primary task of inter-
preting sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d), therefore, lies with the
Board.29 Although the Board's constructions are entitled to
"considerable deference" from the courts,30 the Supreme Court
remains the ultimate interpreter of the statute.31 Conse-
quently, an analysis of the employer's duty to bargain begins
27. The Supreme Court in FNM described references to plant closings in
the legislative history as "inconclusive," 452 U.S. at 676 n.14, although the ref-
&rences that were made indicated that at least a complete closure was per-
ceived as being beyond the scope of collective bargaining, see 70 CONG. RFm
7673 (1935) (statement of Sen. Walsh) ("No one can compel an employer to
keep his factory open. . . . No one can keep an employer from closing down
his factory and putting thousands of men and women on the street. So in deal-
ing with this bill we have to recognize those fundamental things, and we have
not gone into that domain."), reprinted in 2 NLRA HISTORY, supra note 21, at
2394; 79 CONG. REc. 9682 (1935) (statement of Sen. Griswold), reprinted in 2
NLRA HIsTORY, supra note 22, at 3110. Specific references in the legislative
history to work relocation are apparently absent.
28. The legislative reports recognize this flexibility:
This section attempts to limit narrowly the subject matters appropri-
ate for collective bargaining. It seems clear that the definitions are
designed to include collective bargaining concerning welfare funds,
vacation funds, union hiring halls, union security provisions, appren-
ticeship qualifications, assignment of work, check-off provisions, sub.
contracting of work, and a host of other matters traditionally the
subject matter of collective bargaining in some industries or in certain
regions of the country. The appropriate scope of collective bargaining
cannot be determined by a formula; it will inevitably depend upon
the traditions of an industry, the social and political climate at any
given time, the needs of employers and employees, and many related
factors. What are proper subject matters for collective bargaining
should be left in the first instance to employers and trade-unions and
in the second place, to any administrative agency skilled in the field
and competent to devote the necessary time to a study of industrial
practices and traditions in each industry or area of the country, sub-
ject to review by the courts. It cannot and should not be strait-jack-
eted by legislative enactment.
H.R. REP. NO. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947) (minority report) (emphasis
added), reprinted in LMRA HIsTORY, supra note 23, at 362; see also FNM, 452
U.S. at 675 ("Congress deliberately left the words 'wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment' without further definition, for it did not
intend to deprive the Board of the power further to defme those terms in light
of specific industrial practices.").
29. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495 (1979); see infra note 59.
30. Ford Motor Co., 441 U.S. at 495.
31. Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1979)
(Court held actions of Board not within Board's jurisdiction as provided by the
Act); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (Court reversed
decision due to error by Board in determining applicable law).
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more logically with an examination of FNM and the earlier
Supreme Court decisions of NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp.32 and
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB.33
B. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
1. Court Decisions Prior to FNM
The Supreme Court has directly addressed the scope of
mandatory bargaining on only a few occasions since the passage
of the Wagner Act in 1935. In NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp.,34
the Court affirmed the Board's division of bargaining issues
into "mandatory" and "permissive" categories 35 but failed to
suggest any standard for determining what subjects could be
considered "mandatory" as constituting "terms and conditions
of employment." At issue in the case were management's de-
mands for a ballot clause requiring a secret employee vote on
the company's last offer before the union could strike and a
recognition clause identifying the union's local instead of the
32. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
33. See supra note 19. This Article does not address the well-established
duty of the employer to bargain about the effects of such decisions on the em-
ployees. Such a duty was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in FNM 452
U.S. at 677 n.15, and has been consistently imposed by both the Board and the
lower courts, see, e.g., NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933,
939 (9th Cir. 1967); Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1026 (1962),
enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
34. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
35. "Mandatory" subjects are those issues properly characterized under
§ 8(d) as "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," re-
quiring both parties to bargain. 356 U.S. at 349. An employer's refusal to bar-
gain about these subjects, or the unilateral implementation of a change
concerning such subjects, is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(5). See
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). "Permissive" subjects, which are not
conditions of employment under § 8(d), may be discussed by mutual agree-
ment of the parties, but the insistence on such issues to the point of impasse
violates the duty to bargain. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349.
The concept of "impasse" in labor law refers to the inability of the parties
to reach an agreement after engaging in good faith negotiations. See Taft
Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967). Once an employer has bar-
gained to impasse, it may legally make unilateral changes in working condi-
tions consistent with its last offer to the union. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736,
741-42 (1962). Factors considered by the Board in determining whether im-
passe has been reached include the parties' bargaining history, the parties'
good faith, the length of negotiations, the significance of the issues about
which the parties are unable to agree, and the understanding of each party as
to the status of the negotiations. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. at 478.
See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 634-39 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983);
Comment, Impasse in Collective Bargaining, 44 TEX. L. REV. 769 (1966) (dis-
cusses factors in considering whether an impasse exists and the significance of
the impasse).
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certified International as the bargaining representative. The
Court merely asserted that the two proposals were not
mandatory subjects of bargaining with little discussion of gen-
eral principles applicable to the consideration of other bargain-
ing issues.36
It was not until 1964 that the Supreme Court addressed the
scope of mandatory bargaining in the context of economically
motivated management decisions involving operational changes.
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,37 the Court af-
firmed the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(5) violation38 result-
ing from an employer's refusal to bargain about the decision to
subcontract its maintenance work upon expiration of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement covering its maintenance employ-
ees.3 9 The employer anticipated that the subcontracting would
result in "substantial savings" in labor costs. 40 In sweeping lan-
guage, the Court held that the words "terms and conditions of
employment" in section 8(d) "plainly cover termination of em-
ployment which . . . necessarily results from the contracting
out of work performed by members of the established bargain-
ing unit."41 The Court noted that requiring bargaining would
promote the NLRA's "fundamental purpose" of encouraging
peaceful settlement of disputes.42 Moreover, the presence of
subcontracting limitations in a significant number of collective
bargaining agreements indicated the appropriateness of the is-
sue as a subject of bargaining.43 Despite its expansive language,
however, the Court explicitly limited its decision to the specific
type of subcontracting involved in the case, namely, the substi-
36. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349-50.
37. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
38. The procedural history of the case before the Board was much like
that of Otis II, involving a reversal by the Board on reconsideration after a
turnover in the Board's composition. See supra note 14. The original Board
decision in Fibreboard I, 130 N.L.RIB. 1558 (1961), held that the employer had
no duty to bargain about its decision to subcontract, a holding consistent with
Board precedent at that time. See Mahoning Mining Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 792, 803
(1945). Fibreboard I was decided by Members Rodgers, Leedom, Jenkins, and
Fanning, with Member Fanning dissenting. Chairman McCulloch, appointed
by President Kennedy in March 1961, 107 CONG. REc. 3113 (1961), replaced
Member Jenkins. The Supplemental Decision in Fibreboard II, 138 N.L.R.B.
550 (1962), was issued on September 13, 1962, with Chairman McCulloch and
Members Fanning, Leedom, and Brown forming the majority.
39. 379 U.S. at 206.
40. Id.
41. I& at 210.
42. Id. at 210-11.
43. Id. at 211-12.
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tution of one set of employees for another under similar work-
ing conditions.44
The majority opinion in Fibreboard offered few guidelines
for distinguishing between mandatory and permissive bargain-
ing subjects when evaluating relocation or other related types
of management decisions.45 As in Borg-Warner, the majority in
Fibreboard used a definitional approach, simply asserting that
subcontracting is "plainly" a "condition of employment" be-
cause termination of employment can result. Yet any partial
closure, relocation or subcontracting decision would satisfy such
a standard, despite the majority's explicit limitation to subcon-
tracting. Such a definitional analysis seems of negligible value
when dealing with a phrase as vague and open-ended as "condi-
tion of employment."46
44. Id at 215.
45. The confusion created by the majority's expansive language but lim-
ited holding was reflected in subsequent efforts to apply Fibreboard to other
types of management decisions. The courts and the Board diverged almost im-
mediately in their interpretation of the decision. Relying on the broad lan-
guage of the Fibreboard majority, the Board generally held work relocation
and partial closure decisions to be mandatory bargaining subjects. See, e.g.,
Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 737 (1969) (closing ice cream depart-
ment); Red Cross Drug Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 85 (1969) (closing one store in chain
of drug stores), enforced on other grounds, 419 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1969); Drap-
ery Mfg. Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 1706 (1968) (closing drapery production and installa-
tion division), enforced in part on other grounds, 425 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1970);
Thompson Transp. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 746 (1967) (closing truck terminal), en-
forced in part on other grounds and remanded in part, 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir.
1969); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966) (closure of one of em-
ployer's plants); Gopher Aviation, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 1698 (1966) (terminating
service department), enforcement denied, 402 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1968); Weston
& Brooker Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 747 (1965) (abolishing canteen-air-compressor po-
sition), enforced per curiam, 373 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1967); M & A Electric
Power Coop., Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 540 (1965) (discontinuing "bushhog" opera-
tion); Transmarine Navigation Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 998 (1965) (closing Los An-
geles terminal and relocating work), remanded on other grounds, 380 F.2d 933
(9th Cir. 1967); Apex Linen Serv., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 305 (1965) (closing linen
plant); William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1267 (1964)
(terminating Omaha operations), enforced in part on other grounds, 346 F.2d
897 (8th Cir. 1965); Royal Plating and Polishing Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 545 (1964)
(closing one of two metal plating and polishing plants), modified, 152 N.L.R.B.
619 (1965) (supplemental decision), enforcement denied and remanded on
other grounds, 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); cases cited infra note 85.
The appellate courts, however, tended to follow a more cautious approach,
often adopting portions of Justice Stewart's analysis. See text accompanying
notes 47-51; see, e.g., NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir.
1970); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir.
1967); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir.
1965); see also cases cited infra note 46.
46. The circuit courts of appeals, both before and after Fibreboard, were
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Justice Stewart, disturbed by the broad language of the
equally unsuccessful in defining a standard to determine when a relocation de-
cision was subject to mandatory bargaining. Often the circuit courts looked to
the employer's underlying motivation. If there was evidence of antiunion ani-
mus in addition to the refusal to bargain, the courts usually upheld the Board's
finding of a § 8(a)(5) violation. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 356
F.2d 955 (1st Cir. 1966), enforcing 146 N.L.R.B. 931 (1964), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 900 (1966); Philadelphia Dress Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir.
1962), enforcing Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.RIB. 547 (1961); NLRB v. Lewis,
246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957), enforcing in relevant part and remanding Califor-
nia Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955); NLRB v. Tredway, 222 F.2d 719 (5th
Cir. 1955) (per curiam), enforcing Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045
(1954); NLRB v. Gerity Whitaker Co., 137 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1942), enforcing as
modified 33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1941), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 763 (1943).
The courts' reactions have been mixed, however, when the employer's re-
location decision was based on economic considerations. In NLRB v. Rapid
Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961), enforcing as modified 127 N.LR.B.
212 (1960), for example, the Second Circuit reversed the Board's finding of a
§ 8(a)(5) violation where the employer's decision to relocate was based on its
inability to service its customers at its old facility. The decision was considered
by the court to be "clearly within the realm of managerial discretion" and thus
beyond the scope of the bargaining obligation. 293 F.2d at 176. Similarly, in
NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1967), de-
nying enforcement of 152 N.L.R.B. 998 (1965), the Ninth Circuit refused to re-
quire bargaining when the employer relocated its harbor freight operation in
order to continue servicing its principal customer.
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has upheld the duty to bargain concerning
relocation decisions based on economic factors in some contexts. In Weltronic
Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1969), enforcing 173 N.L.R.B. 235 (1968),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970), the court, without discussing the company's
motivation, affirmed the Board's finding of a § 8(a)(5) violation when the em-
ployer refused to bargain about any aspect of its decision to transfer part of
the unit's work to its new plant in order to consolidate certain operations.
Weltronic was later limited to its facts in NLRB v. Acme Indus. Prods., Inc.,
439 F.2d 40, 42 (6th Cir. 1971), in which the court rejected any "absolute" duty
to bargain about an economically motivated relocation decision. Nonetheless,
in NLRB v. Production Molded Plastics, Inc., 604 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1979), en-
forcing 227 N.L.R.B. 776 (1977), the court upheld the Board's finding of a
§ 8(a)(5) violation based on an employer's refusal to bargain concerning a relo-
cation decision following the loss of a major customer contract and the
threatened reduction of its natural gas supply.
This mixed treatment by the circuit courts is evidenced in other cases as
well. Compare, eg., NLRB v. International Harvester Co., 618 F.2d 85 (9th Cir.
1980) (employer decision to reorganize marketing and phase out fleet truck
sales not subject to mandatory bargaining), denying enforcement in relevant
part of 236 N.L.R.B. 712 (1978) and NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d
698 (10th Cir. 1969) (closure of terminal and relocation of remaining work, af-
ter loss of substantial portion of business, was not subject to bargaining), deny.
ing enforcement in relevant part of 165 N.L.R.B. 740 (1967) and NLRB v.
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965) (decision to close
one of two plants was not mandatory bargaining subject), denying enforce-
ment of 148 N.L.RIB. 545 (1964) with Brockway Motor Trucks, Division of
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978) (duty to bargain about
decision to close one of truck sales and service facilities), enforcing 230
1985]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
majority opinion, concurred.47 He emphasized the limits of the
Court's holding and proposed an approach that at least in part
would be endorsed almost twenty years later by the FNM
Court.48 Justice Stewart divided management decisions into
three categories. First, under his analysis, decisions focusing di-
rectly on working conditions or the "physical dimensions of
[the] working environment," such as hours and production quo-
tas, are well-established subjects of mandatory bargaining.49
Other decisions of marginal or indirect impact on employees,
such as advertising and financing, are just as obviously outside
of the bargaining duty.50
The third category of decisions under Justice Stewart's
analysis is comprised of those decisions that directly impact
upon employees by eliminating jobs but involve the "core of en-
trepreneurial control," such as capital investment decisions and
changes in the scope of the employer's operations. According to
Justice Stewart these decisions do not involve employment con-
ditions even though they could result in the termination of
jobs. Thus, under Stewart's anlysis, decisions "fundamental to
the basic direction of a corporate enterprise" are excluded from
the scope of bargaining imposed by sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d).51
2. First National Maintenance
In FNM,52 a majority of the Supreme Court adopted Justice
Stewart's three-part categorization of management decisions.
FNM involved an employer's obligation to bargain about its de-
cision to terminate one of its operations, generally character-
ized as a partial closure. First National Maintenance
Corporation (FNM) supplied maintenance services to commer-
cial facilities in exchange for reimbursement of labor costs plus
a management fee.53 FNM began its operations at the Green-
park Care Center, a nursing home, in April 1976 with a weekly
fee of five hundred dollars. In November 1976, the fee was re-
N.L.R.B. 1002 (1977) and International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v.
NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (plant relocation was mandatory subject
where scope of business was unaltered), enforcing as modified McLoughlin
Mfg. Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 958 (1970).
47. Justice Stewart's concurrence was joined by Justices Douglas and
Harlan. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 217 (Stewart, J., concurring).
48. See FNM, 452 U.S. at 676-77.
49. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 222 (Stewart, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
51. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
52. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
53. Id. at 668.
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duced to two hundred and fifty dollars.54 On July 25, 1977,
FNM notified Greenpark of the termination of its maintenance
service contract following Greenpark's refusal to restore the
management fee to five hundred dollars.55 The FNM employ-
ees working at Greenpark, represented by a union granted cer-
tification only four months earlier, were terminated on July
31.56 The union charged FNM with violating sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(5) for the company's refusal to bargain about the ter-
mination decision.57 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), in
findings adopted by the Board, found FNM guilty of an unfair
labor practice.58 That decision was subsequently reversed by
the Supreme Court.59
The FNM Court began its discussion of the duty to bargain
by adopting the three part categorization of management deci-
sions proposed by Justice Stewart in Fibreboard.6o FNM's deci-
sion to terminate the Greenpark operations was considered in
the third category of decisions, that is, those directly affecting
the employees but involving a concern "wholly apart from the
employment relationship."61 For employer decisions in this cat-
egory, the Court created a balancing test to determine the em-
ployer's bargaining obligation:
[In] view of an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking,
bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact
on the continued availability of employment should be required only
if the benefit; for labor-management relations and the collective-bar-
gaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the
business. 62
54. Id
55. Id. at 669.
56. Id at 669-70.
57. Id. at 670.
58. 242 N.L.R.B. 462, 462 (1979), enforced, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980),
rev'd 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
59. In reversing the Board's conclusion, the Supreme Court omitted any
discussion of the judicial deference purportedly accorded the Board in inter-
preting the NLRA in general and § 8(d) in particular. Only two years before,
in Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979), the Court engaged in a
lengthy discussion of the "considerable deference" due the Board in determin-
ing mandatory subjects of bargaining. Id. at 495-98. The Court upheld the
Board's conclusion in Ford Motor Co. that price increases for plant cafeteria
and vending machine food required bargaining. AL at 503.
60. 452 U.S. at 676-77; see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
61. FN, 452 U.S. at 677.
62. Id. at 679. The FNM Court reconciled the Fibreboard decision by fo-
cusing on the employer's motivation in Fibreboard for the subcontracting deci-
sion. Because the decision was based on a desire to reduce labor costs, a
subject clearly "suitable" to resolution through bargaining, the F7.If Court
1985]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Applying this test, the Court determined that "the harm likely
to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding
whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic
reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained
through the union's participation in making the decision."
FNM therefore was not required to bargain about its partial
closure decision.63
The most disturbing and confusing aspect of the FNM deci-
sion was the Court's apparent adoption of a case-by-case balanc-
ing test, followed by its application of the test in such a way as
to create a per se rule of not requiring bargaining for partial
closure decisions.64 Instead of considering the actual benefits
for the union or burdens upon FNM in the circumstances
presented, the Court focused on abstract speculation concerning
possible benefits and burdens.65 The Court asserted, for exam-
ple, that an employer planning to close part of its operations
may need to move quickly and confidentially to avoid financial
losses, yet there is no indication that FNM had to move quickly
or confidentially in its decision to close its Greenpark
operations.66
Only after the Court rejected any duty to bargain about the
partial closure decision did it return to the specific facts of the
case to "illustrate the limits" of its holding.67 The FNM Court
restricted its rejection of mandatory bargaining to economically
motivated partial closure decisions,68 explicitly denying that its
conclusion applied to other similar types of management deci-
sions, such as plant relocations.69
reasoned that in Fibreboard the Court had "implicitly engaged" in the FNM
analysis. Id. at 679-80.
63. Id. at 686.
64. This point has been noted by numerous commentators. See, e.g., Note,
The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 17, at 334 ("Finally, the Court con-
structed a per se rule by calculating burdens and benefits across widely diver-
gent industries and collective bargaining configurations."); Note, A Balancing
of Interests Test, supra note 17, at 365-66 ("Moreover, at the end of its decision
the Court limited its holding in a manner inconsistent with the per se rule it
had just appeared to adopt."); Note, An Employer's Decision to Terminate,
supra note 17, at 1079 (noting the Court's "apparent statement of a per se
rule"); Florida Comment, supra note 17, at 302 (observing that the Court "may
have unwittingly created a per se rule of its own").
65. See FNM, 452 U.S. at 681-86.
66. See id. at 682-83.
67. See id at 687-88.
68. See id at 687-88.
69. See id at 686 n.22. ("In this opinion we of course intimate no view as
to other types of management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, other
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C. THE NLRB
Prior to its decision in Otis II, the Board had relied on the
FNM Court's limited holding to avoid the application of the
FNM balancing test to relocation decisionsO and to continue a
long,71 although not entirely consistent,72 line of Board author-
ity mandating relocation decision bargaining irrespective of the
kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be considered on their
particular facts.").
In selecting authority to cite as examples of the types of management de-
cisions not encompassed within its holding, the Court, interestingly, only used
cases that held the employer had a duty to bargain. See e.g., International La-
dies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (em-
ployer required to bargain about decision to relocate to another state
motivated by dissatisfaction with the contract work week and seniority provi-
sions, characterized by the court as "labor costs"); Weltronic Co. v. NLRB, 419
F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1969) (transfer of wiring and electronic assembly work to
new plant located three miles away, where no unit employees were laid off as
a result but fourteen unit employees were already on layoff status, held to be a
mandatory subject of bargaining), cerL denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970); Dan Dee W.
Virginia Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. 534 (1970) (employer had a duty to bargain about
decision to change delivery system from driver-salesmen employees to in-
dependent distributors); Young Motor Truck Serv., Inc., 156 N.LR.B. 661
(1966) (dictum) (company was obligated to bargain about decision to sell part
of its business and transfer the remainder but no violation found since union
was given the opportunity to bargain). The Court could certainly have se-
lected from other appellate and Board authority rejecting the duty to bargain
about relocation decisions. See, eg., cases cited supra note 46 and infra note
80. The use of the above cases may have been intended to emphasize the nar-
row limit of the Court's holding with respect to partial closures as well as to
suggest implicit approval for subjecting the employer to the duty to bargain
about relocation decisions in at least some circumstances.
70. See cases cited infra note 91.
71. See infra notes 72-79 & 82-83 and accompanying text.
72. See infra note 80. The Board's early decisions requiring bargaining
about work relocation decisions involved circumstances in which the employer
was motivated by antiunion animus. See, eg., Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119
N.L.RB. 162, 172 (1957), enforced per curiam sub norm. NLRB v. Mackneish,
272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959); California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765, 792
(1955); Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1370 (1954), en-
forcement denied per curiam, 226 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1955); Mount Hope Finish-
ing Co., 106 N.L.IRB. 480, 495 (1953), enforcement denied, 211 F.2d 365 (4th
Cir. 1954); In re Howard Rome, 77 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1218-19 (1948). There is
some indication that the Board may have initially recognized an employer's
right to relocate work when the decision was based on economic considera-
tions. See, e.g., Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1055 (1954) (the Trial
Examiner noted that the Act was not intended to interfere with the em-
ployer's "right to move his business anywhere he pleases"), enforced sub norm.
NLRB v. Tredway, 222 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1955). See generally Murphy, Plant
Relocation and the Collective Bargaining Obligation, 59 N.C.L. REv. 5, 7-8
(1980) (For its first 27 years, the Board usually found a § 8(a)(5) violation in
operational changes only when an antiunion motive could be inferred. "[No
clear theory" on economically motivated changes emerged because the Board
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employer's motivation. As early as 1941, in Gerity Whitaker
Co. 7 3 and Brown-McLaren Manufacturing Co.,74 an employer's
failure to bargain about the decision to relocate unit work was
held unlawful. In Gerity Whitaker, an employer transferred
work to a newly created company to avoid dealing with the
union representing employees at its old facility.75 The Board's
decision to require bargaining was probably influenced by the
antiunion animus involved. A few months later in Brown-Mc-
Laren, however, the Board suggested that a duty to bargain ex-
isted in the context of an economically based relocation
decision.76 Although not defining the extent of the employer's
bargaining obligation under these circumstances, the Board
held that "[w]hatever duty"77 existed was satisfied by the em-
ployer's attempt to negotiate a wage reduction to avoid the
transfer of work.78 That obligation ended, however, once the
company had committed itself to the relocation by acquiring
the new plant site and initiating construction. 79
Following these early indications of an intention to require
bargaining in all relocation decision cases, the Board waivered
in a series of confusing holdings issued prior to 1962.80 In that
failed to distinguish between the effect of a change and the decision to
change.).
73. 33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1941), enforced as modified per curiam, 137 F.2d 198
(6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 763 (1943). The bargaining obligation con-
sidered in Gerity Whitaker and other cases prior to 1947 was based on § 8(5),
the predecessor of § 8(a)(5). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
74. 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941).
75. 33 N.L.R.B. at 398-407.
76. 34 N.L.R.B. at 1006. The company was losing money on goods pro-
duced for one of its primary customers due to low production quotas and high
wages imposed by the parties' first collective bargaining agreement entered
into on March 3, 1937. Id. at 998-99. The company decided to relocate in order
to pay lower wages and therefore reduce production costs.
77. Id at 1006.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1006-07.
80. Compare In re Howard Rome, 77 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1219-20 (1948) (Board
held employer had violated duty to bargain about effects of decision to relocate
in another city to avoid bargaining obligation, with no mention of duty to bar-
gain about decision itself) and Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B.
999, 1000 (1953) (duty to bargain only about effects of relocation decision) and
Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 553 (1961) (employer violated duty to
bargain only by failure to give notice to union of relocation), enforced sub
nom. Philadelphia Dress Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962) with
California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436, 1440 (1952) (duty to bar-
gain about relocation decision), supplemented, 103 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1953) and In-
dustrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 172 (1957) (employer had a duty to
bargain about decision to temporarily shut down and relocate work when in-
tent was to discourage union activity). See also Note, Duty to Bargain: Sub-
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year, the Board reversed its earlier holdings rejecting the em-
ployer's obligation to bargain about subcontracting,81 a related
type of management decision, and mandated bargaining in two
subcontracting decision cases, Town & Country Manufacturing
Co.82 and Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. (Fibreboard I1).83
After the Supreme Court's affirmance of Fibreboard 11,84 the
Board generally was consistent in requiring bargaining over re-
location decisions as well,85 relying on the broad language of
contracting, Relocation, and Partial Termination, 55 GEO. L.J. 879, 902-06
(1967) (noting the inconsistent results in the cases cited above).
81. See eg., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. (Fibreboard 1), 130 N.L.R.B.
1558 (1961); Mahoning Mining Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 792 (1945).
82. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
83. 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced sub nom. East Bay Union of Machin-
ists v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), affd sub nom. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
84. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
85. See eg., Otis Elevator Co. (Otis I), 255 N.L.R.B. 235, 235 (1981); Ar-
mour Oil Co., 253 N.L.RLB. 1104, 1121 (1981); Ohio Brake & Clutch Corp., 244
N.L.R.B. 35, 35 (1979); Coated Prods., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 159, 164-65 (1978) (dic-
tum) (union waived right to bargain), enforced 620 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1980); Los
Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720, 733 (1978) (dictum) (union
waived right to bargain), enforced, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979); Production
Molded Plastics, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 776, 776 (1977), enforced, 604 F.2d 451 (6th
Cir. 1979); Stone & Thomas, 221 N.L.R.B. 573, 576 (1975); Burroughs Corp., 214
N.L.R.B. 571, 579 (1974); R.L. Sweet Lumber Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 529, 538 (1973),
enforced, 515 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975); American
Needle & Novelty Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 534, 534-35 (1973); Regal Aluminum, Inc.,
190 N.L.R.B. 468, 469 (1971); Royal Norton Mfg. Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 489, 492
(1971); Acme Indus. Prods., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 114, 114 (1969), enforcement de-
nied, 439 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1971); Plymouth Indus., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 607, 611-
12 (1969), enforced per cur-am, 435 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1970); Weltronic Co., 173
N.L.R.B. 235, 237 (1968), enforced, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 938 (1970); McLoughlin Mfg. Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 140, 145-46 (1967),
enforced as modified sub nom. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union
v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1967); McGregor Printing Corp., 163 N.LR.B.
938, 939 (1967); Spun-Jee Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 943, 946 (1965), enforcement de-
nied, 385 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1967); International Shoe Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 693, 700
(1965) (dictum) (union waived right to bargain over the decision); Standard
Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 15, 18 (1965).
The Board similarly required bargaining over related types of manage-
ment decisions, such as partial closures. See, e-g., ABC Trans-Nat'l Transp.,
Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 240, 242-43 (1980) (closing truck terminal), modifed, 642
F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1981); Electrical Prods. Div. of Midland-Ross Corp., 239
N.L.R.B. 323, 330 (1978) (closing electrical plant), enforced, 617 F.2d 977 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 871 (1980); L.E. Davis, 237 N.L.R.B. 1042, 1043
(1978) (eliminating unit jobs in conversion to self-service unit), enforced in rel-
evant par4 617 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1980); Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc., 230
N.L.R.B. 1002, 1003 (1977) (closing Philadelphia area sales and service center),
enforcement denied without prejudice, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978); Great Chi-
nese Am. Sewing Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1670, 1671 (1977) (closing plant), enforced
per curiam on other grounds, 578 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978); Production Molded
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the Court's Fibreboard decision.86
The Board's first opportunity to consider the effect of FNM
on employer relocation decisions occurred only one month after
the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard II. In Tocco Divi-
sion of Park-Ohio Industries, Inc.,87 an employer allegedly re-
fused to bargain over a plant relocation decision motivated by
its desire to reduce costs.88 Ignoring any possible application of
FNM, the Board characterized the bargaining obligation as
"well settled" in this area, citing Board decisions prior to
FNM.89 The failure of the Board to mention FNM was at least
Plastics, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 776, 776 (1977) (plant closed after work transfer),
enforced, 604 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1979); P.B. Mutrie Motor Transp., Inc., 226
N.L.R.B. 1325, 1331 (1976) (closing truck terminal); Trading Port, Inc., 219
N.L.R.B. 298, 315 (1975) (eliminating warehouse jobs); Metro Transp. Serv.
Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 534, 536 (1975) (closing part of trucking business); Edward M.
Rude Carrier Corp., 215 N.L.R.B. 883, 891 (1974) (discontinuing part of trans-
portation division), modified, 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2297 (4th Cir. 1976); Royal
Typewriter Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1013 (1974) (closing St. Louis typewriter
plant), enforced in part on other grounds, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); South-
eastern Envelope Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 933, 948 (1973) (closing one of two plants);
Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 567-68 (1966).
For partial closures, however, the Board developed exceptions to the bar-
gaining requirement when there was a significant change in operations, the
termination of a discrete line of business, or circumstances that could not be
affected through bargaining. See, e.g., Brooks-Scanlon, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 476,
477 (1979) (no duty to bargain when partial closure attributable to decrease in
supply of raw materials), review denied sub nom. Local 1017, Lumber & Saw-
mill Workers v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1981); Raskin Packing Co., 246
N.L.R.B. 78, 78 (1979) (partial closure decision based on recision of credit to
employer did not require bargaining although employer was obligated to bar-
gain over effects of closure); Stanley Oil Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 219, 225 (1974) (no
duty to bargain over complete termination of discrete service department);
Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479 (1972) (no duty to bargain about deci-
sion to discontinue distinct tool-and-die business), enforced per curiam, 474
F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1973); General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 952 (1971)
(no duty to bargain about sale of retail store), review denied sub nom. Auto
Workers, Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
86. See, e.g., Spun-Jee Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 943, 946 (1965); International
Shoe Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 693, 699 (1965).
87. 257 N.L.R.B. 413 (1981). The decision was issued on July 30, 1981.
FNM was decided on June 22, 1981.
88. Id. at 413. The case involved the relocation of work from the em-
ployer's facility in Cleveland, Ohio, to Boaz, Alabama. Although both the
Board and the ALJ noted that the employer moved its operations in order to
produce its products at a lower cost, there was no explanation as to whether
this cost savings would result from lower wages, cheaper raw materials, lower
energy costs, or some other factor. See id. at 413, 417.
89. Id. at 413. ("It is well settled that an employer has an obligation to
bargain concerning a decision to relocate unit work.") The Board cited Ameri-
can Needle & Novelty Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 534 (1973).
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disconcerting. 90 Even in later decisions involving similar issues
in which the Board acknowledged the existence of FNM, its
treatment of the case amounted to little more than pointing out
factual distinctions as justification for FNM's inapplicability.91
90. In Whitehall Packing Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 193 (1981) (issued July 24,
1981), the Board similarly ignored any application of FNM to the relocation
bargaining issue. The Board agreed with the ALJ that the employer had un-
lawfully failed to bargain with the union concerning its decision to relocate
unit work to an "alter ego" company. Id. at 193. The employer's antiunion
motivation and concurrent § 8(a)(3) violations, however, may distinguish the
case from the line of authority involving economically motivated relocation de-
cisions. See also Ford Bros., Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 92 (1982), in which the Board
adopted the ALJ's decision in its entirety, holding the employer in violation of
§ 8(a)(5) for its failure to bargain in good faith about the decision to transfer
truck driving work from its Ohio plant to its West Virginia facility, again with-
out mention of FNM. Antiunion animus was also a consideration in Ford
Bros., Inc. Id- at 102-03.
91. See Carbonex Coal Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1307 n.2 (1982) (employer
unlawfully failed to bargain about its decision to transfer unit work, in the
context of antiunion animus and other related unfair labor practices); Bob's
Big Boy Family Restaurants, 264 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1370-71 (1982) (employer un-
lawfully refused to bargain about its decision to shut down its shrimp process-
ing operation and "subcontract" that work to an outside company). In Bob's
Big Boy the Board approved of the distinction made by the ALJ between par-
tial closings and subcontracting. Id. at 1370. Rather than attempt to apply the
FNM balancing test, the Board focused on the question of whether the em-
ployer's actions should be characterized as one type of decision or the other.
Describing the company's "business" as the supplying of prepared foodstuffs to
its restaurants, the majority concluded that the shrimp processing work had
merely been "subcontracted" because the company continued supplying pre-
pared shrimp to its restaurants. The only change was that the shrimp was
now purchased from an outside company rather than prepared internally. Id.
at 1370-71. A strongly worded dissent by former Chairman Van de Water and
Member Hunter asserted that the discontinuance of the shrimp processing was
a partial closure and that the case was consequently governed by FWM. Id. at
1373-74 (Van de Water and Hunter, dissenting).
I The Board relied on FAM, however, when it was presented with facts par-
allel to those considered by the Supreme Court. See U.S. Contractors, Inc., 257
N.L.R.B. 1180, 1181 (1981) (employer had no duty to bargain about its decision
to terminate janitorial services provided under contract to a third party), en-
forcement denied, 697 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1983).
The NLRB General Counsel's approach differed significantly from that of
the Board. Less than a month after FAM, General Counsel William A. Lub-
bers issued a memorandum to NLRB Regional Directors concerning the im-
pact of the decision. 81 Men. Off. Gen. Counsel No. 38 (July 14, 1981),
reprinted in BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK-
1981, at 312-14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK-
1981]. While noting that the Court had explicitly left open the issue of bar-
gaining obligations regarding "other types of management decisions," the Gen-
eral Counsel recognized the possible applicability of the FAM balancing test.
LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK-1981, supra, at 312. The memorandum re-
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II. OTIS ELEVATOR
Given this background, the Board's decision in Otis II rep-
resented a substantial change in position. Otis II involved
United Technologies' acquisition of Otis Elevator Company in
1975.92 Otis's technology was outdated;93 three separate reviews
of Otis's engineering activity indicated a need to consolidate
and improve the duplicative work being performed at Otis's fa-
cilities in Parsippany and Mahwah, New Jersey.94 In July 1977,
research and development employees from Otis's nonunionized
Parsippany operation were transferred to the United Technolo-
gies research and development facility, located in East Hart-
quested that the Regional Offices submit reports of cases involving these ques-
tions so that the impact of FNM could be further assessed. Id. at 313.
In November 1981, the General Counsel issued a second memorandum re-
quiring the application of the FNM balancing test to the "other types of man-
agement decisions" referenced in FNM, including work relocation. 81 Mem.
Off. Gen. Counsel No. 57 (November 30, 1981), reprinted in LABOR RELATIONS
YEARBOOK-1981, supra, at 315-17. The Regional Offices were thus instructed
to analyze relocation decision cases by weighing "factors which would make
bargaining burdensome" against the benefit "for labor-management relations
and the collective-bargaining process." Id. at 316. In determining this benefit,
the Regional Offices were advised to "focus" on the amenability of the em-
ployer's motivation to resolution through collective bargaining. Id.
The General Counsel's analysis is reflected in subsequent decisions of the
NLRB Division of Advice, a division of the Office of the General Counsel re-
sponsible for issuing legal advice on novel or difficult issues, 44 Fed. Reg. 34215
(1979), sec. 201.1.2. In Stewart Sandwiches, Inc., 9 NLRB ADVICE MEM. REP.
(LAB. REL. PRESS) 19,140 (1982), for example, the NLRB Division of Advice
concluded that an employer was not obligated to bargain about its decision to
consolidate its work at a single facility when high overhead did not justify the
maintenance of two separate operations. Id. at 1424. The Division, consistent
with the General Counsel's interpretation of FNM, relied on the fact that the
employer's reasons for the relocation were not amenable to collective bargain-
ing. Id.; see also 1982 Moving & Storage, 10 NLRB ADVICE MEM. REP. (LAB.
REL. PRESS) q 20,075 (1983) (no duty to bargain about transfer of unit work
when decision was not based on labor costs or other factors amenable to collec-
tive bargaining).
Although the General Counsel's interpretation of the FNM balancing test
may be vulnerable to criticism, see generally infra notes 130-133 & 135-136 and
accompanying text, the effort to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate
was at least a more commendable approach than the Board's efforts to ignore
it.
92. Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1281. For a complete factual history of
Otis, see the ALJ's decision and the Board's original decision issued in the case
on March 25, 1981. Otis I, 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981). None of the factual find-
ings were disturbed on appeal to the Board.
93. 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1281. Otis's share of the world elevator mar-
ket was steadily declining, forcing the company to sell its products at less than
cost simply to remain in the market. Id. at 1281-82.
94. Id. at 1282.
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ford, Connecticut.95 In October, management gave final
approval for the transfer of seventeen bargaining unit employ-
ees from Mahwah to the East Hartford facility.96 By that time
construction had already begun in East Hartford on new re-
search facilities for the Otis employees, representing a capital
investment of over two million dollars.97
The professional and technical employees at Otis' engineer-
ing center in Mahwah had been represented for a number of
years by the United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America.98 When the company advised the
Mahwah employees in December 1977 of the decision to trans-
fer the Mahwah "Product Improvement Group" to East Hart-
ford, the parties were bound by a collective bargaining
agreement scheduled to expire on March 31, 1980.99 The union
charged Otis with committing an unfair labor practice by failing
to bargain about the relocation decision, the Board issued a
complaint, and the matter was tried before an ALJ.
The ALJ rejected Otis's assertion of management preroga-
tive and held that it had unlawfully refused to bargain concern-
ing the work relocation. The ALJ specifically found that most
of the Mahwah engineers transferred performed "substantially
the same work," received supervision from some of the same
employees, and used "much of the same equipment" as they
had at the Mahwah facility.100 The ALJ was equally unim-
pressed with Otis's large capital expenditure for the East Hart-
ford facility, noting that the money had been committed before
the decision to relocate the Mahwah employees.101 Finally, the
ALJ emphasized that the decision only required Otis to discuss
the relocation decision with the union; if no agreement was
95. Id. Approximately 30 Parsippany employees were relocated to the
East Hartford facility.
96. I&
97. Id In addition, the company planned a new test tower that raised
Otis's total projected capital investment to approximately 3.5 million dollars
98. Id. at 1282 n.2.
99. Id. Although there apparently was subsequent discussion between
Otis officials and the Union concerning the company's rationale in transferring
the employees, Otis conceded that it had not bargained about the decision.
The company regarded the transfer decision as "essentially managerial in na-
ture." Otis , 255 N.L.R.B. at 244-45.
100. Otis I, 255 N.L.R.B. at 246. The AUJ concluded that the changes in
Otis's operations were "more cosmetic or organizational than significant in
terms of impact on the basic scope of the enterprise." Id.
101. The ALJ noted that the timing of the decisions indicated that the in-
vestment may have been related primarily to the decision to transfer the Par-
sippany employees, not the Mahwah employees. Id. at 245-46.
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reached, Otis could lawfully implement its decision. The opin-
ion noted that bargaining would not have placed any special
burden on Otis.102
The Board's first consideration of Otis, issued on March 25,
1981, upheld the AL's finding of an unlawful refusal to bar-
gain.103 The Board acknowledged the substantial cost of the
new research facility, but it concluded that "this investment did
not signal any change in the direction of [Otis's] activities or in
the character of its enterprise."104 Although both the ALJ and
the Board decisions were issued prior to FNM, they foreshad-
owed the second half of the FNM balancing test by discussing
the absence of any "burden" on the conduct of Otis's business
that would result from its being required to bargain about the
relocation decision.105 While the case was pending appeal, the
102. Id. at 246 ("There is no evidence tending to show that secrecy or some
other competitive consideration was required for Respondent to act quickly
and decisively.").
103. Id at 235. The Board members deciding Otis I were former Chairman
Fanning, former Member H. Jenkins, Jr., and Member Zimmerman, each of
whom had been appointed by President Carter. See supra note 14.
104. Otis , 255 N.L.R.B. at 236.
105. The facts of Otis, as found by the AL, failed to establish any real det-
riment to Otis of mandatory bargaining about the decision to relocate the
Mahwah employees, although that decision was admittedly a corollary to the
decision to consolidate and update its research and development operations.
Id. at 246. The same type of work was being performed by the transferred em-
ployees, albeit in a new location and facility. Id. Certainly there was no deci-
sion "akin to the decision whether to be in business at all" as there was in
FNM when the employer closed down one of its maintenance operations.
FNM, 452 U.S. at 677. The employer's potential need for speed, flexibility, and
confidentiality, relied upon in FNM, id. at 682-83, were absent in Otis, Otis I,
255 N.L.R.B. at 246.
The capital expenditures in Otis should not have excused the duty to bar-
gain. Several courts prior to FNM had required the existence of a substantial
capital investment to justify the employer's refusal to bargain. See NLRB v.
Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011
(1966); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., Inc., 350 F.2d 191, 195-96 (3d
Cir. 1965). Nonetheless, in relying on Justice Stewart's concurrence in
Fibreboard, FNM made it clear that this factor should not be determinative.
FNM, 452 U.S. at 688. FNM's decision to terminate its Greenpark operations
involved no capital expenditure, yet the Court found no duty to bargain based
on the basic change in operations. Conversely, an employer should not be al-
lowed to avoid its bargaining obligations simply by investment. Surely the
duty to bargain must depend on something more than the wealth of the em-
ployer. This is particularly true in the Otis case given the uncertainty of
whether the transfer of the Mahwah employees involved any capital invest-
ment; the new research facility was being built for the Parsippany employees
long before any decision to relocate the Mahwah employees. See supra note
102 and accompanying text.
The first half of the FNM equation, however, is missing from the Board's
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Board requested that it be remanded for reconsideration in
light of FNM.106
The four Board members participating in the reconsidera-
tion of Otis, three of whom had joined the Board since the first
decision,O7 agreed that Otis had no duty to bargain about its re-
location decision.308 In three separate opinions, each member
recognized that the FNM analysis applied to relocation deci-
sions, and thus implicitly agreed that Board precedent mandat-
ing relocation decision bargaining on essentially a per se
basislo9 had to be overruled. On the appropriate interpretation
of FNM, however, the Board diverged.
Although each of the Otis II opinions purported to apply
FNM to the relocation issue presented, three of the four Board
members inexplicably failed to acknowledge the benefit/burden
analysis set forth in FNM.1lo Relying heavily on the need for
predictability in this area, Chairman Dotson and Member
Hunter concluded in their plurality opinion that "[w]hatever
the merits of the [relocation] decision, so long as it does not
turn upon labor costs, Sec. 8(d) of the Act does not apply."'
initial consideration of Otis. At no point does the Board discuss the benefit of
bargaining for labor-management relations. The obvious inability of the union
to address the concerns or motivations of Otis in deciding to consolidate its re-
search and development activities convinced the Board in its reconsideration
of Otis that no bargaining obligation could be imposed. See infra note 163 and
accompanying text. In spite of the three separate analyses of the four Board
members considering the case in 1984, all agreed that the employer's reasons
for its decision were not susceptible to modification or resolution by any alter-
natives or concessions that could reasonably be achieved through collective
bargaining. Id-
106. Otis 1, 115 L.RIRM. (BNA) at 1281.
107. See supra note 14.
108. Otis I, 115 L.R.IM. (BNA) at 1282, 1290 (Dennis, concurring), 1285
(Zimmerman, concurring in part).
109. See supra notes 72-91 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
111. Otis I, 115 L.R.RM. (BNA) at 1282 n.3. The Dotson/Hunter analysis
also seems to emphasize, however, the need for a "fundamental change in the
nature and direction of the business." Id at 1283. The opinion indicates at one
point that a management decision can be characterized as either a change in
direction for the business or a decision based on labor costs. Id at 1282-83
("[Tihe critical factor to a determination whether the decision is subject to
mandatory bargaining is the essence of the decision itself, Le., whether it turns
upon a change in the nature or direction of the business, or turns upon labor
costs; not its effect on employees nor a union's ability to offer alternatives.")
(emphasis in original). Such a formulation seems to be of little value because
management decisions may turn on labor costs and involve a fundamental
change in the business. The sale of a business because of unprofitability re-
sulting from high wages is one example. Conversely, an employer's relocation
of a plant in order to be closer to raw materials is an example of a decision
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The opinion noted that the employer may always choose to bar-
gain voluntarily if labor costs are one of several considerations
in the employer's decision, thus implying that labor costs must
be the sole consideration before bargaining is required.112
Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter did not to mention any
"benefits" to labor-management relations or "burdens" on the
conduct of the employer's business that might result from re-
quiring bargaining.113
The primary deficiency of the Dotson/Hunter plurality ap-
proach is its exclusive focus on labor costs rather than the bal-
ancing of interests prescribed in FNM.114 The plurality's
rejection of determinative labels is commendable; requiring
bargaining based solely on the characterization of a decision as
"subcontracting" instead of "partial closure" is unlikely to yield
predictable or satisfactory results.115 Given the hybrid nature
that "turns" on neither labor costs nor a fundamental change in the company's
business.
In a more recent decision applying their Otis 11 analysis, Chairman Dotson
and Member Hunter echo their confusing formulation without further clarifi-
cation. In Columbia City Freight Lines, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (August 3,
1984), the Board considered an employer's decision to close two of its trucking
terminals and consolidate the work at a third facility. Although labor costs
was one factor in the employer's decision, cost savings from the relocation also
included a variety of nonlabor items such as the elimination of duplicative
overhead. Id-, slip op. at 3. The majority opinion of Chairman Dotson and
Member Hunter concluded, just as in Otis II, that the employer's decision to
close two terminals and relocate the work "turned not upon labor costs but
upon a significant change in the nature and direction of the business and
therefore was not subject to mandatory bargaining." Id., slip op. at 2.
Whether a "change in operation" is required under the Dotson/Hunter
analysis is uncertain. At one point their opinion in Otis 11 suggests that bar-
gaining is required even if the decision can be considered a basic change in op-
erations when that decision was based on a desire to reduce labor costs, See
Otis I, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1282-83. In Columbia City Freight Lines, how-
ever, Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter seem to imply that bargaining is
not required because the employer's decision involved a change in the direc-
tion of the business. Columbia City Freight Lines, 271 N.L.R.B. No. 5, slip op.
at 5 ("These facts establish that the decisions at issue here, no matter what
they are labeled or how they are categorized, clearly turned on a fundamental
change in the nature and direction of the Respondent's business."). If bargain-
ing is not required because a decision is labeled a "change in direction," the
Dotson/Hunter approach seems to engage in precisely the type of characteriza-
tion analysis it purports to reject. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
In other words, by describing the employer's decision as a change in opera-
tions, Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter can conclude by definition that
bargaining is not required.
112. Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1284.
113. Id. at 1281-84.
114. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
115. Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1283.
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of and multiple variations on decisions of this type, reliance on
labels alone is subject to manipulation influenced by underlying
social policy rather than legal principles.116 Nonetheless, the
Dotson/Hunter "labor costs" inquiry is decidedly narrower
than FNM mandates. The substitution of an "either/or" thresh-
old test for the balancing required under the FNM test seems
inconsistent with the duty of the Board to enforce the NLRA
as interpreted by the Supreme Court.117
Even assuming the Dotson/Hunter test yielded the correct
result in Otis II, the inadequacies of this approach for future
cases is apparent when applied to alternative fact situations.
Consider an employer's decision to subcontract the mainte-
nance work in its plant because of the belief that subcontract-
ing will improve work quality. The cost of subcontracting is the
same as performing the work with its own employees.
Fibreboard,18 as well as subsequent Board authority,119 would
dictate mandatory bargaining. In the hypothetical, as in
Fibreboard, the employer's basic operations remain unchanged
and no capital expenditure is involved.12o The employer's ac-
tions concern only "the replacement of employees in the ex-
isting bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor
to do the same work under similar conditions of employ-
ment."12 l Furthermore, work quality has long been considered
a subject suitable for bargaining.122
Similarly, application of the FNM balancing test, under vir-
tually any definition of that test, would result in an obligation
to bargain. Bargaining would provide substantial potential ben-
efits. Even if the benefit for labor-management relations is de-
fined as only amenability to resolution through collective
bargaining,-3 the possibility of assistance by the union is appar-
ent. The manner in which work is performed, as well as the
116. Compare, for example, the majority and dissenting opinions in Bob's
Big Boy Family Restaurants, 264 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1982), when the employer's
decision is characterized as "subcontracting" by the majority and as a "partial
closure" by the dissent. Id. at 1371, 1373 (Van de Water and Hunter, concur-
ring and dissenting); see supra note 91.
117. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. Although the em-
ployer's motivation in Fibreboard was based on cost savings, this fact was not
critical to the Court's conclusion.
119. Key Coal Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 1013 (1979); R.L. Sweet Lumber Co., 207
N.L.R-B. 529 (1973), enforced, 515 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1975).
120. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 213.
121. Id. at 215.
122. See infra note 125.
123. See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
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related issues of training and wage incentives, traditionally has
been an appropriate subject of bargaining.124 Moreover, requir-
ing the company to discuss its decision with the union would in-
volve little burden in the hypothetical presented because the
maintenance work must continue in any event. The cost for
the employer remains unchanged, and it is highly unlikely that
management would have any need for speed, flexibility, or con-
fidentiality in reaching its decision.125
Under the Dotson/Hunter test, however, bargaining would
not be required for a subcontracting decision based on work
quality. Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter, limiting the
bargaining obligation to decisions based solely on labor costs,
foreclose the duty to discuss any other decisions regardless of
the union's ability to address the problem.126 Thus, despite two
Supreme Court decisions requiring bargaining in this situation,
the Dotson/Hunter approach would allow the employer to im-
plement unilaterally its decision.
This hypothetical illustrates the real danger of the Dot-
son/Hunter test: in practical application, it leads to the rejec-
tion of a bargaining obligation in virtually every relocation
decision case. Relocation decisions are rarely based on a single
factor, even though labor costs may be a predominant or deter-
minative motivation. 27 As long as labor costs are not the sole
124. Hedison Mfg. Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1982) (production standards);
Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1980) (production standards); Bio-
Medical Applications, 233 N.L.R.B. 1467 (1977) (dictum) (employee training);
Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 757 (1977) (production standards with ac-
companying counseling and disciplinary system), enforced in part, 587 F.2d 403
(9th Cir. 1978); C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966) (incentive wage
plan); Weston & Brooker Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 747 (1965) (merit wage increases);
Irvington Motors, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 565 (1964) (sales quotas), enforced, 343
F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1965). But see Wabash Transformer Corp., 215 N.L.R.B. 546
(1974) (employer should have flexibility in efforts to promote efficiency).
125. See FNM, 452 U.S. at 682-83.
126. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. The Dotson/Hunter
analysis may be applied expansively or narrowly depending on how the term
"labor costs" is interpreted. Conceivably, "labor costs" could include work
quality as a measure of level of production per man hour. But the plurality
opinion offers no definition.
127. Some of the important factors to management in considering reloca-
tion, in addition to labor costs, include the cost and supply of energy, supply
costs, and outdated facilities. Hearings on Employee Protection and Commu-
nity Stabilization Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1609 Before the Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 169 (1979) (statement of G.
Honeyford, Chairman, Congressional Action Comm., S. Jersey Chamber of
Commerce) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Employee Protection]; id. at 254-
55 (statement of H.R. Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition, "The State
of the Region: Economic Trends of the 1970s in the Northeast and Midwest").
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motivation, bargaining will not be required under the Dot-
son/Hunter analysis,;= regardless of the absence of any burden
on the employer. If the duty to bargain can be so easily
avoided, employers undoubtedly will attempt to fabricate other
reasons for relocation decisions.12 9
Member Zimmerman's analysis is more expansive than the
Dotson/Hunter approach. Member Zimmerman focused exclu-
sively on whether the employer's decision is "amenable to reso-
lution through collective bargaining."130 Thus, whereas the
plurality would require bargaining only if the employer's deci-
sion was based exclusively on labor costs,131 Member Zimmer-
man would expand that concept to include other problems that
may reasonably be resolved through union concessions. Find-
ing that the union could not have affected Otis's decision to
relocate, Member Zimmerman concluded that bargaining was
not required.3 2 Like the plurality, this analysis fails to discuss
the benefit/burden balancing test established in FM.133
Although Member Zimmerman's analysis would require
bargaining in the subcontracting hypothetical above,134 his ex-
clusive focus on "amenability" is also inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's mandate. Even ignoring the problems in de-
fining "[a]menability to resolution through the bargaining pro-
128. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
129. In Milwaukee Spring II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1068, the Board, in an
opinion signed by Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter, held that an em-
ployer could transfer bargaining unit work during the term of a collective bar-
gaining agreement in order to save labor costs without violating the § 8(d)
prohibition on mid-term contract modifications. See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1982). In support of its holding, the Board noted that this conclusion
would promote "realistic" bargaining by allowing the employer to explain
truthfully the motivations for its relocation decision. Milwaukee Spring II, 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1069. Under prior decisions finding such a relocation to be
an unlawful modification of the contract's wage provisions, the Board rea-
soned, employers were encouraged to admit only those motivations that were
unrelated to labor costs. I& The result of the Dotson/Hunter analysis in Otis
1I would seem to have the very effect the Board sought to avoid in Milwaukee
Spring II, namely, encouraging employers to manufacture reasons other than
labor costs for relocating unit work in order to avoid the bargaining obligation
entirely.
130. Otis I, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1285 (Zimmerman, concurring in part).
Member Zimmerman's analysis of FNM is set forth in greater detail in his dis-
sent in Milwaukee Spring II, 115 L.RR.M. (BNA) at 1069-75 (Zimmerman,
dissenting).
131. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
132. Otis I, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1285 (Zimmerman, concurring in part).
133. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
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cess,"135 Member Zimmerman made no serious effort to weigh
the potential or actual burden of bargaining on the conduct of
the employer's business. Although his "amenability" standard
is somewhat broader than the Dotson/Hunter "labor costs" ap-
proach, it is still an "either/or" threshold test. If the amenabil-
ity test is met, Member Zimmerman would excuse the duty to
bargain only if the employer's need for speed, flexibility, or
confidentiality is "urgent,"136 a concept not found in FNM.
Of the four Board members reconsidering Otis, only Mem-
ber Dennis attempted to formulate a balancing test consistent
with the FNM decision. Before reaching this test, however,
Member Dennis imposed a threshold requirement that echoes
Member Zimmerman's analysis: the employer's decision must
be "amenable to resolution through the bargaining process."137
If this threshold is met, Member Dennis would apply a bene-
fit/burden balancing test. She not only used "amenability" as a
threshold, however; it is also the single benefit of bargaining
for labor-management relations in her test.138 On the burden
side of the balance, Member Dennis suggested several possible
factors to be considered.139 Because she determined that the
employer's decision was not amenable to resolution through
collective bargaining, Member Dennis concluded that Otis had
no duty to bargain concerning its relocation decision.140 Thus,
the balancing test she described was never applied because the
threshold test was not met.
Member Dennis's balancing test is consistent with FNM,141
but her imposition of an "amenability" threshold requirement
causes problems similar to those that plague the Zimmerman
approach. In defining amenability, Member Dennis seemed to
adopt the more expansive concept of Member Zimmerman 142
135. Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1285 (Zimmerman, concurring in part).
136. Id.
137. 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1287 (quoting FNM, 452 U.S. at 678) (Dennis,
concurring).
138. Id. at 1288 ("The second step in the analysis, therefore, involves
weighing the fact that the decision is amenable to resolution through the bar-
gaining process ('the benefit') against the constraints that process places on
management ('the burden').") (Dennis, concurring).
139. Member Dennis, quoting from FNM, suggested five potential burdens
in a nonexhaustive list: 1) the extent of capital commitment; 2) the extent of
changes in operations; 3) the need for speed; 4) the need for flexibility; and
5) the need for confidentiality. Id. at 1288; see infra notes 202-11 and accompa-
nying text.
140. Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1290 (Dennis, concurring).
141. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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rather than the restrictive Dotson/Hunter "labor costs" crite-
rion.143 Should Member Dennis limit her definition of "amena-
bility" in future opinions to those employer decisions dealing
primarily or exclusively with labor costs, however, her own
analysis would routinely parallel that of the Dotson/Hunter
analysis.
III. ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF THE FNM
BALANCING TEST
Before addressing the appropriate application of the FNM
balancing test, an initial determination must be made as to the
types of employer decisions subject to the test. Of the three
categories of management decisions described by the SupremeCourt, only the third category triggers the FNM test.144 The
Court described these decisions as having a "direct impact on
employment," usually termination, but involving some concern
outside of the employment relationship.145 Although the Court
offered limited guidance in applying this standard,146 it appar-
143. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 47-51 & 60-63 and accompanying text.
145. FNM, 452 U.S. at 677.
146. Although the Court briefly discussed its rationale for including FNM's
shutdown decision within this third category, it offered little guidance for
making such determinations about other types of employer decisions. See
FNM, 452 U.S. at 677. In Otis II, only Member Dennis even referred to the
need to make such a determination, yet she dismissed it with a single line:
"The [relocation] decision had as its focus only the economic profitability of
Otis' operations, but it also had a direct impact on the employment of unit em-
ployees." Otis I, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1290 (Dennis, concurring). The same
could be said for a decision by Otis to reduce wages. Such reasoning hardly
explains why the relocation was a "Category III" decision, as it was labeled by
Member Dennis. Something more must be required.
Otis may seem to be an "easy" case requiring little analysis as to its Cate-
gory III status. It is undisputed that the employer's decision was part of a sub-
stantial reorganization and consolidation of the company's research and
development efforts. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. Chairman
Dotson and Member Hunter relied heavily in their opinion on the fact that
Otis's decision reflected "a change in the nature or direction of the business."
Otis I, 115 L.FLR.M. (BNA) at 1283 ("The decision at issue here clearly turned
upon a fundamental change in the nature and direction of the business, and
thus was not amenable to bargaining."). Yet in Otis I, former Chairman Fan-
ning, former Member Jenkins, and Member Zimmerman agreed with the de-
termination of the ALT that the relocation did not involve any real change "in
the direction of [Otis's] activities or in the character of its enterprise." Otis I,
255 N.L.R.B. at 236.
This analysis suggests two questions: 1) must an employer's decision in-
volve a change in the scope or direction of the business in order to be a Cate-
gory III decision, triggering the FNM balancing test, and 2) do all relocation
decisions fall within the Category III analysis? If work relocation, absent
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ently assumed that economically motivated work relocation de-
cisions are subject to the balancing test within the third
category.147
A. THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF RELOCATION BARGAINING
As predicted by numerous commentators, 148 the FNM deci-
sion has resulted in substantial confusion regarding its applica-
tion to work relocation decisions.149 In spite of the apparent
creation of a per se rule for partial closures,150 the Supreme
Court seems to require a balancing or weighing of interests to
other changes in the enterprise (e.g., expansion, modernization), is considered
a "change in direction" by definition, the answer to the first question may be
irrelevant for immediate purposes. If a relocation decision is equivalent to a
change in business direction, such decisions will always be subject to FNM
analysis as Category III decisions.
The definitional problem also arises in the context of other types of deci-
sions. Reconsider the proposed hypothetical involving the subcontracting of
maintenance work to improve work quality but with no resulting cost savings.
See supra text accompanying notes 119-21. The Supreme Court in FNM char-
acterized such a subcontracting decision in Fibreboard as a Category III prob-
lem when the employer was seeking to reduce labor costs. The subcontracting
of maintenance work, however, can hardly be considered a change in the
"scope or direction" of a business. The distinguishing characteristic of the Cat-
egory III decision must therefore be in the nature of the decision itself rather
than the extent of operational change.
Thus, any business decision that does not directly concern the employ-
ment relationship (e.g., wages, work rules) but that directly affects the exist-
ence of that relationship (e.g., partial closure, automation, subcontracting)
apparently must be considered a Category III decision. A decision affecting
the scope and direction of the business will also invariably constitute a Cate-
gory III decision, but such a requirement is evidently not mandatory. Any
subcontracting decision, regardless of its motivation, therefore becomes a Cate-
gory III decision subject to the FNM balancing test. Similarly, any relocation
decision must be evaluated under the FNM test. The motivation for the deci-
sion only becomes significant in applying the test.
The extent of change in operations, however, may be properly considered,
as suggested by Member Dennis in Otis II, as one factor in determining the
burden on the conduct of the employer's business. Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 1288 (Dennis, concurring). The more substantial the change in oper-
ation, the more freedom the employer should have to act.
147. See FNM, 452 U.S. at 686 & n.22. Although the identification of em-
ployer decisions within this category may present difficulties independent of
the application of the FNM balancing test to determine the bargaining issue, it
is beyond the scope of this Article and will only be noted here.
148. See supra note 16.
149. See supra notes 87-91 & 107-43 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. Given such a rule, the
classification of the employer's action may be determinative. Deciding cases
by applying labels, however, is misleading; an employer's actions may not eas-
ily fit in a single category. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text;
Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1284. ("Such decisions often involve elements
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determine the bargaining obligation in other situations.15' Un-
fortunately, the Court does not provide a neat checklist of the
factors to be considered. The lack of specificity may indicate a
recognition of the need for flexibility in analyzing diverse fac-
tual situations in a changing industrial relations climate. Con-
sistent with congressional intent, 5 2 the Court presumably
intended the scope of mandatory bargaining to be fluid and re-
sponsive to developing needs.5 3
Recognizing these limits on the development of a disposi-
tive testa'or general use, this Article will attempt to identify
the-fictors that should be considered in a benefit/burden analy-
sis of a relocation decision and also suggest how these factors
might be weighed in some situations. Identifying the factors to
be considered in the benefit/burden analysis requires a careful
reading of the FNM decision. As suggested, any list will be sub-
ject to change as particular cases raise unusual problems and
the Board gains experience in applying the test. As an initial
effort to quantify the test, however, the following discussion de-
scribes two factors to be considered on the "benefit" side of the
balance54 and five factors to be considered on the "burden"
side of the balance.55
1. The Benefit for Labor-Management Relations and the
Bargaining Process
Member Dennis's analysis in Otis 1I imposes a threshold
requirement that the factors underlying the employer's reloca-
tion decision be amenable to resolution through collective bar-
gaining before reaching the balancing test. 56 Once the
of one or more types of decisions, such as the termination, relocation, and con-
solidation of the research and development operations in this case.").
151. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
153. FNM, 452 U.S. at 679 n.18 ('The subjects over which mandatory bar-
gaining has been required have changed over time.").
154. The factors on the benefit side include "communication" and "amena-
bility." See infra notes 156-199 and accompanying text.
155. The factors on the burden side include the employer's needs for speed.
flexibility, and confidentiality, the extent of capital investment, and the extent
of changes in operations. See infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
156. Member Dennis's threshold requirement of amenability should not be
confused with the initial determination of whether the employer's decision can
be characterized as a Category I decision subject to the FNM balancing test.
See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text. Member Dennis acknowledges
in her analysis that this "Category III" determination precedes her own
threshold requirement of amenability. Otis I, 115 L.R.PM. (BNA) at 1287-88
(Dennis, concurring). Member Dennis thus suggests a three step process: 1)
19851
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
threshold is met, this "amenability" determination constitutes
the "benefit for labor-management relations and the collective
bargaining process" in the first part of the FNM balancing
test.157 The benefit is limited to this single factor; thus, even if
bargaining imposes no burden whatsoever on the employer, the
Dennis analysis recognizes no value in bargaining unless the
union "reasonably could effect" the employer's decision.158
Although this "amenability factor" is unquestionably a signifi-
cant and often critical aspect of the "benefit" half of the test,
the FNM decision suggests other potential benefits ignored by
Member Dennis.
In FNM, the Court recognized the important and legitimate
concerns of unions in these situations, regardless of the em-
ployer's motivation.159 In applying its analysis to the particular
facts of FNM "to illustrate the limits" of the holding, the Court
specifically noted that it was not "faced with an employer's ab-
rogation of ongoing negotiations or an existing bargaining
agreement."160 This reference to missing factors would be
meaningless unless the Court was suggesting that the existence
of a collective bargaining agreement or a long-term bargaining
relationship could alter the balance. Because the union in FNM
could not affect the basis of the employer's decision, namely,
the size of its management fee paid by Greenpark,161 the
Court's analysis indicates that the "benefit" of bargaining for
the union and employees in an ongoing union/employer rela-
tionship involves something more than amenability. In other
words, the bargaining process itself may serve some valuable
function for "labor-management relations" in addition to any
potential resolution of the employer's problems that might be
achieved.162
determining if the employer's decision is a Category III decision subject to
FNM; 2) if so, determining if the employer's motivations are amenable to reso-
lution through collective bargaining; and, 3) if so, balancing this amenability
benefit against the burden placed on the conduct of the employer's business.
157. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
158. Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1288.
159. "[T]his [partial closure] decision touches on a matter of central and
pressing concern to the union and its member employees: the possibility of
continued employment and retention of the employees' very jobs." FNM, 452
U.S. at 677.
160. Id. at 687-88.
161. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
162. The existence of a stable and ongoing bargaining relationship may be
related to the concept of amenability as well. It is reasonable to assume that a
union's increasing familiarity with an employer's business over time will en-
hance its ability to develop proposals and concessions to address the company's
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a. The Communication Benefit
Each of the Otis II opinions concludes that bargaining
should not be required because the union could not effectively
address the reasons underlying the employer's decision to relo-
cate-the outdated technology and the duplicative research ef-
forts.16 3 Although the Board members' concern with fruitless
negotiations is appropriate, their analyses are inadequate be-
cause they rest on an unarticulated major premise: the sole
purpose of requiring collective bargaining under the NLRA is
to permit a union the opportunity to present other options
when the employer's proposed actions are based on considera-
tions related to its labor relations. In other words, each of the
Otis II opinions assumes that if the union is unable to provide
concessions or alternatives that will directly affect the em-
ployer's motivation, collective bargaining should not be re-
problems and concerns. See N. LEViN, SUCCESSFUL LABOR RELATIONS 118
(1963) ("Very often [union representatives] will have experience due to work-
ing with production men and operating personnel, and they can be helpful [in
solving company problems].").
163. Otis I, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1282-83, 1285 (Dennis, concurring).
1290 (Zimmerman, concurring in part). As described by Member Dennis in
her concurring opinion:
There were no labor-related considerations underlying the decision.
There was nothing that the Union could have offered that reasonably
could have affected management's decision. Even if the Union had of-
fered pay or benefit cuts or proposed overtime work to increase pro-
ductivity, such proposals would not have provided the Respondent
with the upgraded technology it sought. It is unrealistic to believe
that the Union could have guaranteed that the unit employees would
develop improved design concepts. It is also unlikely that the Union
could have offered an alternative solution to the problems of diffuse
and duplicative engineering activity and outmoded facilities. Cer-
tainly the Union was unable to alter the fact that the parent company
was located in Connecticut, not New Jersey.
Id. at 1290 (Dennis, concurring). Thus, even with the most optimistic view of
the novel and innovative solutions that can be achieved through collective bar-
gaining, speculation about how the union in Otis could have productively ad-
dressed the company's problem of outdated technology seemed a fruitless
exercise.
The formulation of the "labor costs" test by Chairman Dotson and Mem-
ber Hunter in the plurality opinion involves a somewhat different approach
but implies a similar result. See supra notes n1-12 and accompanying text.
"Labor costs," such as wages and fringe benefits, are clearly mandatory sub-
jects under § 8(d) "amenable" to collective bargaining. See, eg., Bancroft Mfg.
Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 1007 (1974) (paid holidays); Gray Line, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 88
(1974) (hourly rates of pay), enforced in relevant part 512 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (pensions), enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). But see discussion supra note 111.
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quired regardless of the presence or absence of any burden
imposed on the employer by the duty to bargain.
The Otis case illustrates this point. The AL's factual find-
ings suggest, if not establish, that Otis would have suffered lit-
tle or no burden in bargaining with the union about its work
transfer decision.164 The findings also establish that the union
could not affect the motivation underlying the employer's deci-
sion.165 The issue facing the Board was therefore reduced to
the following: assuming that requiring Otis to bargain over its
decision would have imposed no burden whatsoever, should
bargaining be mandated even though the union's ability to ad-
dress the employer's concerns is limited or negligible? This can
be answered in the affirmative only if collective bargaining has
value for labor-management relations irrespective of any reso-
lution or problem-solving function it more typically serves.16
164. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 132 & 140 and accompanying text.
166. See Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 214 ("[I]t is not necessary that it be likely
or probable that the union will yield or supply a feasible solution but rather
that the union be afforded an opportunity to meet management's legitimate
complaints.") (quoting from the underlying opinion of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, 322 F.2d 411, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1963)); Comment,
Duty to Bargain About Termination of Operations: Brockway Motor Trucks
v. NLRB, 92 HARV. L. REv. 768, 779-80 (1979) ("[P]articipation by employees in
managerial decisions which affect their vital personal interests may be desira-
ble for its own sake, apart from any dividends it may yield in terms of socially
efficient decision-making. Such a value has implicitly been recognized in the
NLRA since its inception.").
The "value" of collective bargaining referred to here should not be con-
fused with the suggestion of some commentators that collective bargaining can
be beneficial as a potential means of evolving unusual and creative solutions to
an employer's problems. Certainly recent collective bargaining history has
shown that companies can be greatly assisted, if not actually saved from bank-
ruptcy, by union proposals and concessions that may be only indirectly related
to the marketing or product problems at the heart of the employer's difficul-
ties. The American automobile industry is perhaps the most dramatic exam-
ple. The revitalization of the American automobile industry depended to a
great extent on union concessions, even though the companies' financial crisis
is often attributed to the increase in imports, rising gasoline prices, and a gen-
eral economic recession. See 110 LABOR RELATIONS REPORTER (BNA) Special
Report No. 23, Labor Relations in an Economic Recession: Job Losses and
Concession Bargaining 9-14, 18-19 (July 19, 1982). For examples of other
union concessions, see Note, Let's Make a Deal, supra note 17, at 744-45 n.213.
This is only to suggest, however, that traditional ideas about the types of
problems that can be addressed through collective bargaining are too narrow.
Thus, in determining what types of issues are "amenable" to the collective bar-
gaining process, the argument continues, the perspective should be more ex-
pansive. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text. The scope of the duty
to bargain is certainly flexible enough to encompass such expansive concepts
and was intended to be so by Congress. See supra note 28.
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In upholding the constitutionality of the NLRA shortly af-
ter its enactment, the Supreme Court stated that the "[r]efusal
to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes
of strife" in industrial relations,167 an assertion repeated by the
FNM Court.168 Having the opportunity to understand an em-
ployer's motivations is of significant value to a union and, ulti-
mately, to the represented employees. Personnel manuals
often emphasize the importance of communication between
management and employees in effective employee relations.169
One of the reasons employees join unions is the perception of
participation in the business operations through collective bar-
gaining,170 and communication between labor and management
is considered critical in preventing union organization by those
who specialize in management consulting.171
Communication does not just benefit labor or management;
it also benefits "labor-management relations and the collective
bargaining process."172 Discussing the reasons for, and partici-
pating in, work relocation decisions must inevitably increase
the likelihood that employees will understand and thus acqui-
esce in such management decisions without the potential inter-
ference of grievance arbitration, a breach of contract action, or
a strike to protest the employer's actions. 73 This would serve
167. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937).
168. FNAM, 452 U.S. at 674 n.l-.
169. See generally HuMAN REsouRcEs MANAGEMENT: PERSONNEL PRAC-
TICES/COMMUNICATIONS 3300 (Morale, Productivity), 5500 (Communication
Methods) (CCH) (1981); How Much Do You Tell Your Employees About Their
Pay? HUMAN REsouRcEs MANAGEMENT. IDEAS & TRENDS, Pre-Publication Is-
sue No. 1, 1-2 (CCH) (1981).
170. A. Cox, D. BOK & IL GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw
16 (8th ed. 1977) (':Ulnions helped to give employees a sense of participation
in the business enterprises of which they are part-a function of labor unions
which became important as organization spread into mass production
industries.").
171. See, eg., R. LEWIs & W. KRUPMAN, WINNING N.LR.B. ELEcTIONS:
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PROGRAMs 17 (PLI) (2d ed. 1979)
("A major cause of unsatisfactory employee relations is poor communications
or no communications at all. It is a truism in human relations, whether at
home or at work, that communicating can avoid misunderstanding. But, com-
municating is a two-way process. It requires listening, as well as speaking.").
172. FPAM, 452 U.S. at 679.
173. In a report to Congress in 1902, many years before the enactment of
the NLRA, the Industrial Commission stated:
The chief advantage which comes from the practice of periodi-
cally determining the conditions of labor by collective bargaining di-
rectly between employers and employees is, that thereby each side
obtains a better understanding of the actual state of the industry, of
the conditions which confront the other side, and of the motives
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the interests of both the employer and the employees by dif-
fusing the sense of unfairness and abuse that employees facing
the consequences of unemployment undoubtedly feel.174 The
enhancement of mutual respect, a sense of fairness and due
process, and a smooth transition are at least partial justifica-
tions for requiring collective bargaining even when no union
concessions or proposals are expected to resolve the employer's
underlying problems.75 As the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has stated, "The underlying philosophy of the Labor Act
is that discussion of issues between labor and management
serves as a valuable prophylactic by removing grievances, real
or fancied, and tends to improve and stabilize labor rela-
tions." 176 Consequently, the benefit to labor-management rela-
tions provided by communication is an appropriate
consideration in determining whether an employer should be
required to bargain about a relocation decision.177
which influence it. Most strikes and lockouts would not occur if each
party understood exactly the position of the other.
H.R. Doc. No. 380, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 844 (1902).
174. See generally B. BLUESTONE, B. HARRISON & L. BAKER, CORPORATE
FLIGHT: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC DISLOCATION 24-35
(1981); U.S. DEPT. OF H.E.W., PUB. No. 77-224, TERMINATION: THE CONSE.
QUENCES OF JOB LoSS 174-81 (1977) (discussing the financial, psychological, and
physiological effects of job loss for 100 employees terminated by the shutdown
of two manufacturing plants studied).
175. In response to the argument that there is inherent value in the pro-
cess of collective bargaining, the employer may counter with the converse to
that argument, namely, that there is an inherent burden in requiring the em-
ployer to bargain about a decision that should be left to its own business judg-
ment. Yet when such a decision "touches on a matter of central and pressing
concern to the union and its member employees," the Supreme Court has held
that this "need for unencumbered decisionmaking" must be subject to the
FNM benefit/burden analysis. FNM, 452 U.S. at 677, 679; see John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964) ("The objectives of national
labor policy, reflected in established principles of federal law, require that the
rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their businesses ..
be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the
employment relationship.").
176. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 369 F.2d 891, 895 (4th Cir.
1966).
177. The FNM Court intimated that the value of the communication bene-
fit increases with the existence of a current collective bargaining agreement or
a long-term relationship. FNM, 452 U.S. at 688. A collective bargaining agree-
ment creates certain expectations of stability on the part of the union and em-
ployees that deserve some consideration. A long-term relationship between
the parties enhances the prospects for mutual understanding and cooperation
because each party will become more familiar with the other's problems and
concerns over time. Cf. ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE COMMISSION REPORT, S.
DOC. 6, 58th Cong., Spec. Sess. 63 (1905) ("Experience shows that the more full
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Bargaining for its own sake is beneficial as a means of fos-
tering respect and understanding in labor-management rela-
tions, even though the primary function of bargaining remains
dispute resolution.178 When the employer's relocation decision
is based on circumstances beyond the union's power to change,
and the burden imposed by bargaining is substantial,79 the
Board should not require bargaining simply because of the com-
munication benefit to labor-management relations arising from
the bargaining process itself. Except in unusual circum-
stances,18 0 however, bargaining will not impose substantial bur-
dens on the employer. Requiring the employer to bargain does
not obligate the employer to reach an agreement with the
union;l81 having bargained in good faith to impasse, the em-
ployer is free to implement a relocation decision consistent
with its statutory duties.82 If an employer can bargain con-
cerning its relocation decision without burdening the conduct of
its business in any way, the independent benefit that communi-
cation provides to labor-management relations should tip the
balance towards requiring the employer to bargain. "Much is
gained even by giving each side a better picture of the strength
of the other's convictions,"183 and if no burdens offset that gain,
bargaining should be required.
the recognition given to a trades union, the more businesslike and responsible
it becomes.").
178. See infra notes 184-99 and accompanying text. The FNM decision sug-
gests that amenability was not intended to be the sole criteria, as it was in the
Board's analysis in Otis II. Bargaining itself may be a benefit to "labor-man-
agement relations and the collective bargaining process" even though that pro-
cess does not affect the final decision. FNM, 452 U.S. at 679 (emphasis added).
179. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 215-30 and accompanying text.
181. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) ("For the purposes of this sec-
tion, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions- of employment ... but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."); FNM', 452
U.S. at 678 n.16 ("The Act does not compel agreements between employers
and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever. It does not pre-
vent the employer 'from refusing to make a collective contract . . .' The the-
ory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited
representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may
bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not
attempt to compel.") (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
at 45).
182. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962); see supra note 35.
183. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1412
(1958).
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b. The Amenability Benefit
Because the primary function of bargaining is dispute reso-
lution, amenability to bargaining is clearly the more significant
factor in weighing the benefit of bargaining. In fact, the man-
ner in which "amenability" is defined will often predetermine
the outcome on the ultimate issue of whether a bargaining obli-
gation will be imposed. To illustrate, an employer's decision to
transfer unit work in order to take advantage of a lower wage
scale available in another area is almost certainly a decision
"amenable to resolution through collective bargaining" under
any of the analyses discussed or proposed.184 Assume, however,
the employer decides to relocate because of an increase in the
rental rate of its present facility. Under the Dotson/Hunter
test, no bargaining is required since the decision does not "turn
upon labor costs."185 Moreover, the Dotson/Hunter approach
suggests that a decision must be based solely on labor costs to
be "amenable."186 By defining amenability narrowly, the Dot-
son/Hunter analysis avoids balancing and establishes almost a
per se rule of no duty to bargain because relocation decisions
will seldom be based solely on labor costs. 8 7
Member Dennis apparently adopts a broader definition of
184. Such a decision would, by definition, satisfy the "labor costs" test used
by Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter, see supra notes 111-12 and accom-
panying text, as well as the "amenability" test proposed by Member Zimmer-
man, see supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. Similarly, Member
Dennis's threshold requirement of amenability would be easily met, and her
analysis would also require bargaining in the absence of some unusual burden
on the employer. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
185. Otis I, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1282; see supra notes 118-21 and accom-
panying text.
186. Otis I, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1283.
187. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. The result under the
Zimmerman analysis is less clear. At one point, Member Zimmerman refers
to the union's ability to "affect the reasons underlying an employer's decision."
Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1285 (Zimmerman, concurring in part) (empha-
sis added). This statement suggests a narrow definition of amenability. For
example, because a union does not exercise control over the employer's land-
lord, a decision to relocate because of a rental increase would not be amenable
to bargaining. At another point, however, Member Zimmerman states that
"amenability ... necessarily encompasses situations where union concessions
may substantially mitigate the concerns underlying the employer's decision,
thereby convincing the employer to rescind the decision." Id. (Zimmerman,
concurring in part) (emphasis added). A union's offer to reduce wages or ben-
efits to offset the rental increase would mitigate the employer's concerns
about the increased expense and may affect its decision. Therefore, Member
Zimmerman seems to define amenability more broadly, although his analysis
is somewhat ambiguous. See also id. at 1285 (Zimmerman, concurring in part)
(emphasis added).
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amenability. She refers to the union's ability to "affect... the
employer's decision,"188 which would suggest the possibility of
offset bargaining. In other words, although the union may be
unable to affect directly the employer's reasons for a decision,
it may be able to alter the decision itself.189
The wide range of definitions used by these four Board
members, all purporting to interpret and apply the same au-
thority, illustrates the potential for manipulation in determin-
ing "amenability." Although this problem may be incapable of
complete resolution, at least within the bounds of the FNM de-
cision, it can be diminished by recognizing the concept of ame-
nability as a continuum rather than an "either/or" proposition.
At one end of the spectrum is a relocation decision based solely
188. IL at 1288 (Dennis, concurring) (emphasis added).
189. Similarly, the Board's General Counsel adopted a broad definition of
amenability that includes offset bargaining in its guidelines issued to the
NLRB regional offices concerning the application of the FNrM decision. 81
Mem- Off. Gen. Counsel No. 57 n.13 (November 30, 1981) ("If the employer's
decision is based on economic factors unrelated to labor costs (e.g., increase in
rent), but union concessions in the area of labor costs could counterbalance
these economic factors, the employer's decision would be considered amenable
to the collective bargaining process."), reprinted in LABOR RELATIONS YEAR-
BOOK-1981, supra note 91, at 315-17.
The Supreme Court's definition of amenability is unclear. In FNM, the
Court seemed to focus on the union's ability to affect the underlying reason
for the employer's decision. Thus, the Court noted the union's lack of control
over the size of the management fee, the justification for the employer's shut-
down, without discussing the possibility that wage concessions might have re-
sulted in Greenpark's willingness to increase the fee. FNM, 452 U.S. at 687-88;
cf. i& at 690 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Even where labor costs are not the di-
rect cause of a company's financial difficulties, employee concessions can often
enable the company to continue in operation-if the employees have the op-
portunity to offer such concessions."); Note, Enforcing the NLRA. supra note
17, at 311-12 ("A union can generally offset third-party factors with conces-
sions in areas it does control .... An efficient business considers all possible
levels of capital and labor and selects the most productive combination of two
factors.... Futility can be determined only by the choices of the primary
parties.").
Still, the facts in F!NM, unlike the hypothetical presented, involved a prob-
lem two steps removed from the union. In the hypothetical, the union has no
control over the rental rate but can directly offset the increase, leaving the ul-
timate determination in the hands of the employer. In FNM, however, Green-
park reimbursed FNM for all labor costs, regardless of the size of the
management fee. FAM, 452 U.S. at 668. Even if the union had offered wage
concessions, FNM could only have offered them to Greenpark as an incentive
to increase the management fee. The final decision would have been left to
Greenpark, not the employer. I&L at 687-88. Although the Supreme Court's
discussion of "amenability" in FNM seems to imply the rejection of "offset bar-
gaining" as part of that concept, such a conclusion is not necessarily precluded
by the decision since the case can be factually distinguished.
1985]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
on an employer's desire or need to reduce wages. This is the
classic issue "amenable" to resolution through collective bar-
gaining,190 and only a substantial burden on the conduct of the
employer's business should overcome the bargaining obligation.
At the opposite end of the continuum is a situation such as the
one presented in Otis II. Although it is always possible to imag-
ine that some combination of union proposals or concessions
could have affected the employer's decision in that case,191 the
practical "amenability" of the problems of outdated technology
and duplicative research activity to the collective bargaining
process was minimal.192
Between these two extremes exist a variety of factual situ-
ations that must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The more
susceptible the problem is to resolution through collective bar-
gaining,19 3 the greater the burden must be on the employer to
avoid the duty to bargain. A strict "either/or" definition of
amenability, such as the Dotson/Hunter approach, prevents this
balancing. Since the amenability factor is to be used as part of
a balancing test, measuring it in shades of gray rather than sim-
ply black or white is appropriate. Certainly, the burden factor,
on the other side of the balance, must be measured in this man-
ner.19 4 The issue is rarely whether an employer will be bur-
dened by imposing an obligation to bargain, but rather how
much it will be burdened; the amenability benefit must be as-
sessed in the same way.
In determining the value or "degree" of the amenability
benefit, the Supreme Court has offered at least one significant
objective criterion: current industrial practice. Although ig-
nored entirely by all three opinions in Otis II, the Court has re-
peatedly used this factor in considering the duty to bargain.
Industrial practice, although not determinative, has been relied
upon as an "indication" of the amenability of an issue to the
bargaining process.195 In Fibreboard, for example, the Court
190. See cases cited supra note 164 and infra note 227.
191. See E. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROB.
LEM 199 (1957) ("There is literally no entrepreneurial activity in the produc-
tion and sale of goods that cannot conceivably be influenced by union activities
to the advantage of union members.").
192. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 62 & infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
195. FNM, 452 U.S. at 684; see Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 211 ("It is appropriate
to look to industrial bargaining practices in appraising the propriety of includ-
ing a particular subject within the scope of mandatory bargaining. Industrial
experience is not only reflective of the interests of labor and management in
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supported the imposition of a duty to bargain by concluding
that subcontracting was "widely and successfully" discussed in
collective bargaining, as evidenced by a number of labor con-
tracts containing provisions on the issue.196
Although it is relevant to consider current industrial prac-
tice in determining amenability, the lack of agreements within
the industry addressing an issue must not be conclusory as to
its lack of amenability.197 Amenability should be broadly de-
the subject matter but is also indicative of the amenability of such subjects to
the collective bargaining process.") (footnote and citation omitted).
196. 379 U.S. at 211-12. The Court cited a study in which one-fourth of the
agreements surveyed contained some limitation on subcontracting. Id. at 212
n.7. If the Board members had referred to similar statistics in Otis I, they
would have discovered that restrictions on shutdowns or relocations occurred
in 18% of the sample contracts of all industries reviewed in one study. 2 COL.
LEcirvE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) § 65:3 (1983).
Although this percentage is not high, it indicates some degree of amenability,
at least enough to require bargaining by the employer when no burden on the
conduct of its business would result.
In addition to the "all industry" figure of 18%, the study showed the pres-
ence of restrictions on shutdowns or relocations in 50% of the contracts sur-
veyed in the apparel, furniture, rubber, leather, and maritime industries. Id.
These statistics present the issue of whether the classification of mandatory
bargaining subjects could vary by industry. The additional uncertainty for the
employer that would be created by such an idea, see FNM, 452 U.S. at 684-85, is
probably a sufficient reason in itself to avoid this result, given the confusion
that already exists in determining relocation decision bargaining. Nonetheless,
the concept of a variable standard is not without some support. The legislative
history of § 8(d) notes that the determination of mandatory bargaining issues
should be left to the Board in order that it may examine "industrial practices
and tradition in each industry or area of the country." H.R. REP. No. 245,
supra note 28, at 71, reprinted in 1 LMRA HISTORY, supra note 23, at 362.
There is also Board precedent in other areas for applying different rules
to different industries. Bargaining history within the industry, for example, is
a factor considered by the Board in determining the appropriateness of a bar-
gaining unit. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 162 N.L.RLB. 387, 397 (1966); C.
MoRRs, supra note 35, at 411. Unit determinations, like the scope of
mandatory bargaining, see supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text, were gen-
erally left by Congress to the discretion of the Board. See NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 134 (1944); NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)
(1982). Industry practice is also a consideration in resolving jurisdictional dis-
putes under § 10(k) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1982). International Ass'n
of Machinists, Lodge No. 1743, 135 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1410 (1962); see THE DEVEL.
OPING LABOR LAW, supra note 35, at 684.
197. One difficulty with using industrial practice as the measure of amena-
bility is that it focuses on the employer's actions as opposed to its motivation.
Subcontracting provisions, for example, often prohibit subcontracting in its en-
tirety without distinguishing between subcontracting to reduce labor costs,
subcontracting to improve work quality, or subcontracting to avoid restrictive
seniority provisions. Yet in discussing the "amenability" factor in FNM, the
Court was referring to the employer's motivation, namely, the refusal of
Greenpark to increase the management fee. This dichotomy is evident in
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fined to encourage creative and innovative bargaining.198 If the
union members face possible unemployment due to an em-
ployer's decision to relocate, the union will have a strong incen-
tive to propose creative alternative solutions.199
Member Dennis's statement that Otis would have been required to bargain
about a relocation limitation (presumably regardless of the reasons for a fu-
ture relocation decision) as a provision of a collective bargaining agreement
even though no such duty is imposed on Otis once relocation is actually con-
templated. Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1289 n.16.
"Amenability" must perhaps be recognized as a two-part concept in order
to be properly understood. Amenability could refer to either an employer's ac-
tions or motivations. Reconsider the employer whose rental rate has been in-
creased by a third-party lessor. See supra text accompanying notes 184-96. If
the employer chooses to respond to that increase by a wage reduction, that
"action" is surely subject to mandatory bargaining even though the "motiva-
tion" is a factor beyond the union's power to affect directly. Should the em-
ployer choose to relocate based on the same motivation, however, there is no
duty to bargain if "amenability" requires that a union be able to affect directly
the employer's motivation.
Does it make sense to require bargaining in one situation but not in an-
other when the employer is simply responding in alternative ways to the same
change in circumstances? The irony of this result, at least from the employ-
ees' perspective, is that it is the relocation decision, about which bargaining is
not required, that has the far greater impact on employees. The only answer
may be that the first decision to reduce wages would not constitute a "third
category" of management decision under Justice Stewart's Fibreboard concur-
rence adopted in FNM. In other words, bargaining about a wage reduction is
required because it is directly concerned with the employment relationship,
not because of the result of any balancing analysis under FNM.
198. For example, union concessions were undoubtedly critical to the revi-
talization of the American automobile industry, although the industry's
problems of recent years have often been attributed to nonlabor factors, such
as increased foreign competition, rising gasoline prices, and a general economic
recession. See supra note 166.
199. See supra note 166 and sources cited therein for examples of union
concession bargaining. In FNM the Court acknowledged the existence of cases
in which union concessions had assisted or saved failing businesses. FNM, 452
U.S. at 681 n.19. The Court rejected such experience as a justification for im-
posing mandatory bargaining about partial closure decisions, however, because
the situations had "come about without the intervention of the Board enforc-
ing a statutory requirement to bargain." Id. Such reasoning essentially "begs
the question." The Court has ignored the not unlikely possibility that the em-
ployers in question were willing to bargain with the union because they under-
stood it to be their statutory obligation, as the Board held in its underlying
decision in FNM. 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979). Given the Board's general require-
ment of bargaining about relocation and partial closure decisions before FNM,
see supra note 85 and cases cited therein, an employer would be unlikely to
risk the consequences of unlawful unilateral action, see Kramer & Schindel,
Collective Bargaining Obligations in Plant Closings, Divestitures and Other
Transformations: A Management View, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNI.
VERSITY THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR § 14.01 (R.
Adelman ed. 1983) ("Because the risk is so great, and judicial correction is
years away, employers often bargain these decisions.").
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2. The Employer's Burden
Identifying factors to be considered in measuring the bur-
den of bargaining on the employer, the other half of the FAM
balancing test, is a less complex task. In analyzing the FNM
partial closure, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Board's
concern must be with the burden on the "conduct of the busi-
ness."200 Any bargaining may be "burdensome" to the em-
ployer to some degree, given the time and expense involved, as
well as the loss of freedom to make business decisions without
union agreement. 20 ' The focus, however, must be on the poten-
tial harm to the business that may result from imposing a duty
to bargain.
Although the "burden" factors suggested in FNM are more
apparent than the "benefit" factors, the Court failed to provide
any definitive guidelines. The factors considered important by
Member Dennis in her Otis II concurrence, however, reflect a
thoughtful and careful reading of FNM2o2 and provide a basic
framework to begin the analysis. Member Dennis proposes five
factors to be considered in determining the employer's burden
in a relocation situation: 1) the need for speed; 2) the need for
flexibility; 3) the need for confidentiality; 4) the extent of the
capital investment; and 5) the extent of the change in
operation. 20 3
200. F:M, 452 U.S. at 679 (emphasis added).
201. See id. at 682-83; Richfield Oil Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 356, 362 (1954)
("[I]ntrusions in management affairs... occur whenever an employer fulfills
his statutory obligation to bargain collectively.").
202. See Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1288 (Dennis, concurring).
203. Id- The employer's needs for speed, flexibility, and confidentiality are
discussed by the Supreme Court in FNM. 452 U.S. at 682-83. Member Dennis
supplements this list with the two additional factors. Otis I, 115 LR.M.
(BNA) at 1288 (Dennis, concurring).
Although the Court expressed great concern about the possible financial
impact of mandatory bargaining on the employer, it failed to acknowledge the
devastating economic impact on the employees and their communities of the
unemployment resulting from a partial shutdown or work relocation. By 1980,
for example, almost 10,000 jobs in the steel industry were lost in a single
county in Ohio. One study estimated the consequent loss of an additional
24,200 manufacturing jobs in other industries in the same county, representing
a yearly loss of $500 million in wages for the community. T. Buss & S.
REDBURN, SHUTDOWN AT YOUNGSTOWN 68-73 (1983). See generally B. BLUE.
STONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 67-72 (1982)
(discussing the "multiplier effects" of plant closings on local employment and
the economy). Lost wages represent only part of the problem. The value of
the loss of hope and life is, of course, incalculable. Unemployment has been
linked to an increased rate of suicide, as well as a variety of physical and psy-
chological problems. Id. at 63-66. See generally B. BLUESTONE, B. HARRiSON &
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The employer's need for speed, flexibility, and confidential-
ity will rarely apply to a relocation decision. A relocation deci-
sion necessarily entails a decision to terminate one operation
and to begin or expand another, a decision that requires sub-
stantial study and advance planning. Thus, the employer will
rarely have a need for speed or flexibility.204 Similarly, the ex-
tensive planning involved suggests that confidentiality often
will not be essential.
Several appellate courts prior to FNM considered the ab-
sence or existence of a significant capital expenditure as deter-
minative of the bargaining issue.2 05 In FNM, however, the
Court did not consider FNM's lack of any capital investment in
its decision to shut down its Greenpark operation to be "cru-
L. BAKER, supra note 174, at 24-35; Kay & Griffin, Plant Closures: Assessing
the Victims' Remedies, 19 WILLAMEITE L.J. 199, 201-204 (1983).
The element that may be missing from this Article's proposed analysis is a
high degree of predictability. The FNM Court seemed particularly concerned
that the employer not be faced with the uncertainty and risk of not bargaining
because of the potential consequences of making an erroneous decision. See
FNM, 452 U.S. at 684-85. The need for predictability was also a primary con-
sideration in the Dotson/Hunter analysis. See Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
1283. Given the introduction by the Court of a balancing test to decide these
issues, however, high predictability may be an unrealistic goal. In spite of the
apparent adoption of a per se test for economically motivated partial closure
decisions in FNM, the Court's language seems to mandate the application of a
balancing test for other types of "third category" management decisions. The
Court was careful to limit its holding to the FNM facts and explicitly excluded
from its opinion "other types of management decisions, such as plant reloca-
tions." See FNM, 452 U.S. at 686 n.22.
The use of a balancing test and the achievement of the predictability of a
per se test appear irreconcilable. Perhaps the Court's concern can be utilized
in close or borderline cases. Thus, where there are both some benefits to the
labor-management relationship and some burdens on the conduct of the busi-
ness, the decision should be in favor of the employer and find no bargaining
obligation. The employer would then have some reassurance that it will re-
ceive the "benefit of the doubt" when faced with a difficult evaluation of its
bargaining duty. The Court's concerns about the consequences for the em-
ployer of unlawfully refusing to bargain can be further diffused by the reluc-
tance of the Board to impose harsh remedies in such cases. See infra note 231.
204. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Harvester Co., 618 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir.
1980); NLRB v. Draper Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v.
Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1967), denying en-
forcement of 152 N.L.R.B. 998 (1965), on remand, 170 N.L.R.B. 389 (1968);
NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1965); see
also National Car Rental, 252 N.L.R.B. 159, 163 (1980), enforced in relevant
part, 672 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1982) (decision involving the liquidation of one of
company's facilities and the sale of half the company's inventory of trucks was
essentially a managerial and financial decision not requiring advance
bargaining).
[Vol. 69:667
RELOCATION BARGAINING
cial."206 Nonetheless, the Court did not exclude this factor
from consideration entirely. Given the numerous court and
Board decisions that have accepted the capital investment crite-
rion as an important or determinative factor when considering
the burden of the duty to bargain, and the absence of an ex-
press disavowal by the Supreme Court, Member Dennis prop-
erly included it in her list.
Similarly, Member Dennis's inclusion of the extent of
change in the employer's.operations was appropriate. The FNM
Court considered the extent of changes in the employer's busi-
ness operations to be significant, although it did not explicitly
include this factor in its discussion of the potential burden on
the employer of requiring bargaining over a partial closure de-
cision. 20 7 The Court emphasized the magnitude of the change
in FNM's operations, a change "akin to the decision whether to
be in business at all" and "not unlike ... going out of business
entirely."208 The more fundamental and significant the busi-
ness changes, the greater the interference of mandatory bar-
gaining with the employer's "need to operate freely."2 9
3. Striking the Balance
Balancing the benefits against the burdens of collective
bargaining on the conduct of the employer's business by defini-
tion requires comparing two very distinct concepts. FNM de-
mands that the benefits must be greater than the burdens on
the employer before a bargaining obligation is imposed.21o Un-
doubtedly, in a number of cases the result of the balancing will
be evident. An employer's decision to relocate for the purpose
of reducing wages, for example, will generally be a subject of
mandatory bargaining. The amenability benefit is at its highest
value in such circumstances 21 ' and, combined with the commu-
nication benefit in a stable bargaining relationship,212 would
outweigh the burdens imposed on the employer in most in-
206. FNM, 452 U.S. at 688.
207. See i&. at 682-86.
208. Id at 677, 688.
209. Id. at 686.
210. FNAM, 452 U.S. at 679 ("[B]argaining over management decisions .. .
should be required only if the benefit, for the labor-management relations and
the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct
of the business."). Accordingly, if the benefits and burdens are equal, no duty
to bargain would be imposed.
211. See supra note 189.
212. See supra notes 167-76.
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stances. 213 Even in situations in which the amenability value is
much lower, bargaining should be routinely required when
there is no corresponding burden on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business.
In other circumstances, balancing will dictate that no duty
to bargain be imposed on the employer. When an employer is
required to relocate in order to retain the business of its princi-
pal customer, for example, it will often be necessary to act ex-
peditiously. The substantial need for speed and flexibility in
such a case would rarely be outweighed by the benefit of collec-
tive bargaining, consisting of limited amenability value com-
bined with the less significant communication value.214
Most situations, however, will fall between these two ex-
tremes. The application of the test proposed can be illustrated
by reevaluating Adams Dairy, Inc.,215 a case discussed in both
the Dotson/Hunter and Dennis analyses in Otis I.216 Adams
Dairy processed and distributed milk and dairy products on a
wholesale basis to retail outlets. Deliveries of the company's
products were made by employees called "driver-salesmen,"
although the employer made some sales at its facility to in-
dependent distributors. The employees were paid a salary plus
commission on sales. In negotiations for the parties' third con-
tract, effective September 1, 1959, for a three-year term,21 7 the
employer expressed concern about keeping delivery costs low
in order to remain competitive with rival dairies.218 Only two
months after this collective bargaining agreement went into ef-
fect, the company unsuccessfully sought to reopen the contract
to discuss delivery costs. 219
213. Only in an unusual situation would an employer have significant need
for speed and flexibility when relocating a plant. Such a substantial decision
by a company more typically would follow months or even years of study and
consideration, allowing sufficient opportunity for discussions with the union.
See B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 127; B. BLUESTONE, B. HARRI-
SON & L. BAKER, supra note 174, at 93.
214. See NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.
1967).
215. 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), enforcement denied in relevant part, 350 F.2d
108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
216. Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1283 (Dotson/Hunter), 1289 (Dennis,
concurring).
217. Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. at 820. The driver-salesmen had been
represented by the union for six years.
218. Id. at 820.
219. Id. Evidence also indicated, however, that the company was competi-
tive with other dairies at least with respect to sales to its primary customers,
representing 80% of its business. Id. at 820-21 n.4.
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In February 1960, without prior notice to the union, Adams
Dairy terminated its driver-salesmen and replaced them with
independent distributors.220 The equipment formerly used by
the driver-salesmen was sold to the new independent distribu-
tors.22 ' The employer had apparently been considering such a
change for some time. In addition to references in the 1959 ne-
gotiations about the use of independent contractors by another
dairy, the company as early as 1955 had approached its employ-
ees individually to ask if they would be interested in becoming
independent distributors.222
In this situation, both benefit factors--communication and
amenability-must be given substantial weight. The communi-
cation value, present to some degree in all collective bargaining,
is enhanced by the presence of a long-term relationship be-
tween the parties and a current collective bargaining agree-
ment.2 m3 Further, the facts suggest that Adams Dairy's
concerns about delivery costs were primarily related to labor
costs.2 24 Labor costs are a classic example of an issue amenable
to resolution through the collective bargaining process;2  thus,
the amenability benefit is significant.
Requiring collective bargaining by Adams Dairy would not
have imposedan appreciable burden on the conduct of its busi-
ness. Adams Dairy did not appear to have any special need for
speed, flexibility, or confidentiality; indeed, it had discussed
with its employees using independent contractors five years
220. Id. at 821-22.
221. Id- at 822.
222. Id. at 820, 823 n.9.
223. See FM, 452 U.S. at 688; supra note 177 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. The Trial Examiner
made no specific findings as to the employer's motivations in subcontracting
the delivery work because he considered the duty to bargain about such a deci-
sion well-established by past authority. Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.B. at
823. Specific findings on this issue would, of course, be expected in future de-
cisions applying the balancing test developed here. Nonetheless, the evidence
suggests that Adams Dairy would have responded differently had the union
agreed to a decrease in wages and/or commissions when the company at-
tempted to reopen the contract in November 1959. In their discussion of Ad-
ams Dairy in the Otis II decision, Chairman Dotson and Member Hunter
apparently assumed that labor costs were not the basis of the employer's deci-
sion. See Otis II, 115 L.R.RM. (BNA) at 1283. There is no explanation or cited
authority for this assumption, however.
225. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982); Gray Line Inc., 209 N.L.R.B.
88 (1974) (rates of pay), enforced in relevant part; 512 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Honolulu Star Bulletin, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 763 (1965) (incentive wage
plans).
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before implementing the change.226 The two remaining factors,
however, must be given some weight in the balance. Adams
Dairy altered its capital structure by selling its delivery trucks
to the independent distributors. Similarly, using independent
contractors represented some change in operations, although
not a substantial one. The company had used some independ-
ent contractors prior to the termination of the driver-salesmen,
and the substance of the operations, the delivery of the prod-
ucts, remained unchanged.
Applying the proposed balancing test, bargaining should
have been required.227 The moderate burden imposed on the
conduct of Adams Dairy's business by subjecting the employer
to mandatory bargaining is outweighed by the substantial bene-
fit for labor-management relations and the collective bargain-
ing process. Had the company raised this issue in November
1959, when it sought to reopen the collective bargaining agree-
ment, some accommodation likely would have been reached by
February 1960, when the decision was implemented.
Otis II thus may be incorrect or, more accurately, incom-
plete. Even assuming the absence of any amenability value in
examining the benefit of mandatory bargaining for labor-man-
agement relations, the communication value is increased by the
existence of a long-term bargaining relationship between the
parties and a current collective bargaining agreement. 228
Although less significant than the amenability value, the com-
munication benefit must prevail when no burden is placed on
the conduct of the employer's business by requiring bargaining.
From the facts as described by the ALJ, the extent of the bur-
den on Otis is unclear.229 Given the substantial investment and
reorganization involved in moving its research center to the
new Connecticut facility, some degree of "burden" may have
226. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. It is possible that factors
not mentioned by the Trial -Examiner caused the company to act when it did.
In attempting to apply the FNM test retroactively, facts will inevitably be
omitted from the findings that could affect the outcome.
227. The Eighth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's imposition of a
duty to bargain because the case did not involve "just the substitution of one
set of employees for another;" rather, it involved a "change in the basic operat-
ing procedure" and "a change in the capital structure." NLRB v. Adams
Dairy, 350 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1965). Of course, Adams Dairy was decided
sixteen years before the Supreme Court adopted a balancing approach in
FNM.
228. Otis II, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1282 n.2; see supra note 177 and accom-
panying text.
229. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
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been present. This burden was probably sufficient to match or
outweigh the limited benefit of the communication value. The
ALJ suggests, however, that the investment and reorganization
decisions -primarily involved the nonunionized Parsippany em-
ployees, not the Mahwah bargaining unit employees.=0 In the
absence of such findings, the Board's result cannot be properly
evaluated under FNM.
4. Flexibility in the Bargaining Obligation
The viability of the FNM balancing test may depend on the
Board's willingness to remain flexible in determining what con-
stitutes good faith bargaining within the context of relocation
and related types of management decisions. "Bargaining in
good faith" is far from a definitive concept. On the contrary,
the efforts required to fulfill that obligation may vary widely
depending on the exigencies involved. In one of the first deci-
sions discussing the duty to bargain, the Board stated that "no
general rule as to the process of collective bargaining can be
made to apply to all cases. The process required varies with the
circumstances in each case."231
Although bargaining for a new agreement may often be a
lengthy process, good faith bargaining to impasse about a con-
templated work relocation can be accomplished quickly if nec-
essary.232 The more immediate the employer's plight,
particularly when the issue in question has only a small "ame-
nability value," the more quickly the parties may reach an im-
passe. Under these circumstances, a valid impasse can be
reached within a matter of days or even hours, allowing the
230. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
231. Sands Mfg. Co., 1 N.L.RB. 546, 557 (1936). The Supreme Court has
similarly noted that "a statutory standard such as 'good faith' can have mean-
ing only in its application to the particular facts of a particular case." NLRB v.
American Nat'l-Ins. Co., 343 U.S. at 410.
232. See Betlem Service Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1016 (1983) (impasse was reached after only two bargaining sessions and two
subsequent telephone contacts when the union refused to consider any agree-
ment unless its terms were identical to a contract recently entered into be-
tween the union and an employer association in the same industry); E.I.
DuPont, 189 N.L.RIB. 753, 754 (1971) (when the employer announced its inten-
tion to close the employee cafeteria on nights and weekends, impasse was
reached in a matter of days because the union's proposed alternatives were
"frivolous" and "the union's position was fixed, so that further discussion of
these subjects would have been futile"); cf. Gulf States Mfg. Inc. v. NLRB, 704
F.2d 1390, 1398 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Whether an impasse exists depends on
whether, in view of all the circumstances of the bargaining, further discussions
would be futile.").
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employer to implement its decision almost immediately, unilat-
erally, or as modified by union agreement. 233
The power of the Board to "tailor" the bargaining obliga-
tion to the circumstances should alleviate an employer's con-
cerns that its ability to act will be restricted.234 A union's
attempt to avoid or protract bargaining to delay the employer's
actions-a concern expressed by the FNM Court235-would ex-
cuse any continuing duty to bargain on the part of the em-
ployer.236 A union cannot be allowed the privilege of
bargaining only to abuse its purpose. A union's resort to dila-
tory tactics would result in the forfeiture of its right to demand
further bargaining, releasing the employer to act
unilaterally.237
233. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741 (1962).
234. See Golden Bay Freight Lines, 267 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1983), in which the
Board held that the union had waived any right to bargain about the em-
ployer's partial closure decision because of its failure to respond to the com-
pany's notification. In letters of June 22 and 23, the company advised the
union that it was considering closing one of its terminals. The union was
asked to contact the company by July 1 if it wanted to discuss the matter.
When the union did not respond, the terminal was closed on July 2. The em-
ployer's quick action was necessitated by threatened eviction because of past-
due rent, as well as the threatened closure of one of its remaining facilities by
the Internal Revenue Service because of defaults on taxes. Id. at 1076.
235. 452 U.S. at 683.
236. See AAA Motor Lines, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 793 (1974) (employer law-
fully made unilateral changes in employment terms after union's refusal to
meet with company representatives to bargain about proposed contractual
changes).
237. The employer's dilemma-to bargain or not to bargain-may also be
considered by the Board in determining an appropriate remedy when a
§ 8(a)(5) violation is found. Although the FNM Court expressed concern about
imposing "harsh remedies" on the employer should it incorrectly determine
that it had no bargaining duty, see FNM, 452 U.S. at 684-85, the Board has
rarely required reopening of a closed or relocated facility when the employer
acted for economic reasons and such a remedy would place a significant bur-
den on the company, see Production Molded Plastic, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. at 778
("The Board, however, is reluctant to order the resumption of operations, es-
pecially where, as here, the closing is for nondiscriminatory reasons."); see also
Whitehall Packing Co., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 193 (1981); Cleveland Freight Lines,
Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 324 (1981) (company ordered to suspend closing of facility in
order to allow bargaining in a case where company did not answer Union's
complaint filed with the Board); Armour Oil Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 1104, 1104
(1981) (company's transfer of trucks to another facility in anticipation of a la-
bor strike and the attendant potential for vandalism held not to violate
NLRA); P.B. Mutrie Motor Transp., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1325 (1976); cf. Smyth
Mfgs. Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 1139, 1172 (1980) (employer ordered to reopen plant
where remedy would not threaten company's thriving business); Soule Glass &
Glazing Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 792, 806 (1979) (employer required to reopen opera-
tions where inconvenience to employer was "relatively slight"), modified 652
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IV. CONCLUSION
Applying a balancing test can be difficult even when the
test is clearly defined. The failure of the Supreme Court to
provide concrete direction in FNM makes the determination of
mandatory bargaining subjects an even more perplexing en-
deavor. The danger of close questions, however, does not jus-
tify the Board's continued refusal to attempt the task.=s In
Otis II, the Board took the initial step of acknowledging the ap-
plicability of FUM in considering an employer's duty to bargain
about a work relocation decision. Its failure to take the second
and more critical step of balancing the benefits of bargaining
for labor-management relations against the burden on the con-
duct of the employer's business in determining the bargaining
issue is indefensible.
The analysis proposed here will unquestionably require re-
finement as the Board gains experience in applying FTM to re-
location and other related management decisions. Until further
guidance is provided by the Supreme Court, however, the task
of developing the balancing test must commence with the eval-
uation of those factors suggested in FAM as possible considera-
tions. The need for reexamination in the future is of less
concern than the Board's unfulfilled responsibility to begin this
task.
F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981). The Board's usual remedy in such cases is to order
the employer to bargain about the relocation or partial closure decision and
award back pay to the affected employees until one of the following events oc-
curs: 1) the parties reach agreement; 2) the parties reach a good faith bargain-
ing impasse; 3) the union fails to request bargaining within five days of
notification of the employer's willingness to bargain; or 4) the union fails to
bargain in good faith. See Cleveland Freight Lines, Inc., 254 N.LR.B. at 236;
P.B. Mutrie Motor Transp. Co., Inc., 226 N.L.RB. at 1325.
If the Board maintains a flexible "bargaining in good faith" definition, the
burdens imposed on the conduct of the employer's business by mandating bar-
gaining will be minimized.
238. The Board has been required to apply equally difficult balancing anal-
yses in other areas. In considering the rights of nonemployee union organizers
to solicit on an employer's property, for example, the Board has been in-
structed to balance the employer's property rights against the § 7 rights of the
union and employees to organize or participate in other concerted action.
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982); see NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S.
105, 112 (1956). A similar analysis is required in determining the right of strik-
ing employees to picket their employer in a shopping mall. See Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-22 (1976).
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In Memory of Steven M. Block, 1951-1984
The Editors and Staff of the Minnesota Law Review dedi-
cate this issue to Professor Steven Block. Though his stay here
was short, he touched the lives of many students with his open-
ness, his humor, and his powerful concern for the dignity of
the individual
